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Introduction
It seems the scientific survey is in a bad shape these days. Polls are deemed unre-
liable to predict election outcomes (Skibba, 2016), Big Data analysis promises to
deliver insights more cheaply and reliably than survey results (Japec et al., 2015)
and respondents are just unable to be convinced to participate in surveys (Meyer
et al., 2015).
At the same time there is an increasingnumberof large scale surveys inGermany
(Nationale Kohorte, the National Education Panel Study and the Programme for
the International Assessment of AdultCompetencies - Longitudinal to name just a
few) (Rat für Sozial- undWirtschaftsDaten, 2017), election polls are still the best
predictor for election outcomes (Kennedy et al., 2017) and while response rates
are still low we seem to have reached the bottom (Keeter et al., 2017) some panel
surveys still register very high retention rates (Schoeni et al., 2013).
I conclude that there still is a demand for the kind of knowledge only old fash-
ioned probability based surveys can generate: Insights on how the public feels
about a topic, capturing trends and developments in societies and generate data
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of high quality on these for scientific research (Couper, 2013).
While there is a demand for surveys and their performance being much better
than how they are currently perceived there are undoubtedly challenges for survey
research, of which survey nonresponse “is increasingly becoming the most press-
ing issue”(Couper, 2013, p. 153).
Nonresponse increases the likelihood of not observing important information
about the population in a survey. The resulting data can then be biased resulting
in nonresponse bias (see Groves & Couper, 2012) (see section 2.1).
One measure to counter nonresponse in surveys is the use of respondent in-
centives (Pforr et al., 2015). Respondent incentives are items, gifts or money
presented to respondents as encouragement to take part in a survey (Boulianne,
2008). Incentives can take on many forms, however my dissertation will focus on
cash incentives as I have experimental data on this incentive form.
When I entered the world of survey research in 2006 and visited conferences I
became fascinated with presentations on incentive use by international colleagues
(e.g. at the MOLS conference, (Laurie & Lynn, 2009)).
Research on how incentives improve response rates have a long history in sur-
vey methodology. In an early meta-study by Armstrong (1975), which collects
studies published as early as 1931 (Shuttleworth, 1931) two of the fundamental
questions on the use of incentives are examined. First, what is the optimal value of
an incentive? Researchers want to pay as little as possible to keep the survey bud-
get small but they want the best possible results on outcomes like response rates.
And second, should the researcher offer an incentive before or after the interview?
Offering the incentive prior to the interview may be more efficient but also more
expensive as more sample members receive an incentive. Armstrong concludes
that “The only type of monetary incentive that has an impact on the nonresponse
rate is the prepaid monetary incentive”(Armstrong, 1975, p. 116).
However, the research on incentive use continues until the present day and the
questions of “how much” and “when” are still being examined. In chapter 3 I in-
troduce a comprehensive overview on types or modes of respondent incentives.
As will be shown in chapter 3, there are many different kinds of incentive designs
and effects can differ between these incentive designs.
Whereas incentives where not used regularly in Germany (Pforr et al., 2015),
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reports on incentive success by scholars and practitioners from the United States
or Great Britain were very encouraging (for examples and citations see section 3).
However, German surveys were late to adopt incentive use (Pforr et al., 2015).
Later inmy career, I was fortunate to work on two projects evaluating the use of
respondent incentives in the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe
(SHARE) (Börsch-Supan, Krieger, & Schröder, 2013) and the German Internet
Panel (GIP) (Blom et al., 2015). Both studies are being described as data sources
in chapter 5.
Themain body of this dissertation are three experiments on respondent incen-
tives.
The incentive experimentshave similarities but also coverdifferent aspects of in-
centive use. All experiments are conducted in the first wave of a longitudinal study
with the goal to motivate respondents not only to participate in one survey, but to
stay for the long haul. All experiments include at least one condition, offering cash
incentives upfront without any strings attached (unconditional cash incentives).
The first experiment I present in chapter 5 is comparing unconditional cash in-
centives to conditional cash incentives in the GIP recruitment survey. I present
effects on response rate and sample composition. The added twist to this experi-
ment is that the values of both types of incentive are chosen in away that their total
cost is the same: payinge 10 offered conditionally to about half the (responding)
sample members compared to e 5 sent unconditionally to all sample members.
Incentive effects in this experiment are thus measured under the realistic assump-
tionof a fixed survey budged, that needs to be usedmost effectively on an incentive
scheme.
The cost aspect is expanded on chapter 6 when discussing the GIP reminder
incentive experiment. Here I compare registration rates to the GIP online panel
conditional on receiving an unconditional cash incentive with a reminder letter
to just receiving the reminder. In addition to reporting on registration rates and
sample composition I examine if the use of the cash incentive was cost effective
for the GIP project.
Finally, I included the results of the SHARE Germany wave 4 incentive experi-
ment form 2011. Parts of the results presented in chapter 7 are taken from a work-
ing paper on this topic (Börsch-Supan, Krieger, & Schröder, 2013). However, the
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results fit nicely into the present volume and the presentation has been improved
and the findings are still relevant for todays survey researchers:Testing uncondi-
tional cash incentives of high value in a setting of a large, national face-to-face
study.
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Theory on incentives and survey response
In this chapter I will explainwhy incentives are being used in surveys. Thepurpose
of respondent incentives is to influence respondents’ behavior, to encourage them
to take part in the survey. In this process, as (supposedly) more sample members
take the survey, survey participation increases and survey nonresponse decreases.
In a meta-study on the impact of nonresponse rates on nonresponse bias,
Groves & Peytcheva (2008) conclude that there is no automatic link between
response rates and nonresponse bias. While high response rates reduce the risk of
nonresponse bias, “some surveys with low nonresponse rates have estimates with
high relative nonresponse bias”(Groves&Peytcheva, 2008, p. 183). In section 2.1
I will show why survey participation is important for survey quality by discussing
the relationship between nonresponse and nonresponse bias, a form of survey
error.
While there is no direct link between non-participation and survey error, I will
show that large numbers of nonparticipants increase the likelihood of the occur-
rence of such an error.
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After establishing the importance of minimizing nonresponse (or more pre-
cisely the nonresponse bias) I will focus my attention on why incentives can help
counter non-participation in surveys. For this purpose I look at theories of re-
sponse behavior (see section 2.2.4) in order to examinewhy samplemembers take
part in a survey at all. Theories can then help explain the mechanisms of how and
why survey incentives can be used to nudge respondents into participating.
In section 3 I will discuss the relevant literature on how incentives have been
used in thepast. Different formsof incentive use and their effectswill be described.
Past research will also help us discover successful incentive use in the past.
2.1 Nonresponse and nonresponse bias
It can be assumed that with the first surveys in history came the first nonrespon-
dents. Whenever surveys are conducted, somemembers of the sample will refuse
to cooperate. This even holds true for mandatory surveys such as the German
Mikrozensus, where refusing is considered a misdemeanor. For example, in 1996,
2,356 units out of 58,084 refused to cooperate in the State of Hesse alone, from
which 91 ended up being ordered to pay a fine. Encouragingly, in a report to the
Hesse parliament the administrators state that they are not seeking jail sentences
in these cases (Al-Wazir & Staatskanzlei Hessen, 1997). This example is just to il-
lustrate that there will always be nonresponse. The task at hand is to minimize it
as much as possible.
In this section the term nonresponse will be defined and the potential negative
effects on data quality will be explained.
2.1.1 (Unit) nonresponse
Idistinguish several typesofNonresponse (Goyder, 2008). If just someanswers to
questions are not gathered I speak of item nonresponse. If the sampled unit drops
out altogether, this is called unit nonresponse. Attrition is a special case of unit
nonresponse, where a sampled unit that once participated in a survey drops out
from subsequent panel waves. In this chapter, I concentrate on unit nonresponse.
The terms nonresponse and unit nonresponse are used interchangeably.
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Nonresponse rates are defined as the proportion of cases in the samle that are
invited to participate but do not participate due to refusal, absence, illness and so
on.
Next, I examine the consequences of this non-participation, the error induced
by nonrespondents.
As straightforward as this may sound, the definition of what constitutes an el-
igible sample member can be debated and has lead to establishing common defi-
nitions (AAPOR, 2016). The sampling frame sometimes contains sample mem-
bers that are ruled ineligible during fieldwork. If, for example, private households
are sampled and an interviewer finds a business at a sampled address the unit is no
longer followed and ruled ineligible for the survey. Ineligible sample units are then
taken out of the equation when calculating response rates. Generally, response
rates can be written as
RRƾ = I
(I+ P) + (R+ NC+ O) + (UH+ UO)
(2.1)
where I are complete interviewswhich are divided by the sumof all eligible sample
members: those that have been interviewed (complete and partial interviews(P),
those that have not been interviewed (refusals and break-offsR, non-contactsNC,
and other outcomesO) and those samplemembers with unknown eligibility (Un-
known if household/occupied housing unit UH and Unknown, other UO) (AA-
POR, 2016)).
Missing from the equation are ineligible cases, they are not used in the calcula-
tion of nonresponse rates. It becomes clearwhy coding asmanyunits from refusals
and known eligibility into the non-eligible cases category will increase response
rates: The cases are removed from the denominator of the equation.
To avoid confusion and give data producers a guideline, agreedupondefinitions
are being used. Themost widely used definitions are the standard rates published
by the American Association for Public Opinion Research (AAPOR) (2016).
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2.2 Hownonresponse may affect data quality
“The basis for unbiased inference from relatively small observed samples to large
unobserved samples is probability sampling”(Singer, 2006, p. 637). If we find
systematic nonresponse in a survey, the principles of probability sampling can be
violated (Stoop, 2012). Nonresponse is systematic when response is correlated
with survey variables. For example if sample members in a face-to-face study on
fear of crime refuse to participate because they are afraid to open the door due to
fear of crime. In this case respondents differ systematically from nonrespondents.
2.2.1 Nonresponse bias
We have learned so far how unit nonresponse is defined and how a bias introduced
by nonresponse can affect data quality. I will now focus on a formalization of this
nonresponse bias.
2.2.2 Measuring nonresponse bias
There are two ways of formalizing nonresponse rates, the deterministic and the
probabilistic formula. In earlier work (see Groves & Couper, 2012), nonresponse
biaswas estimatedwith thedeterministic formula. It is thereby assumed, that there
are fixed, disjoint parts of samples, the respondents and the nonrespondents. They
either participate or do not participate in surveys. The nonresponse bias of the
unadjusted respondent mean Yr can be formalized as
B(yr) = (
M
N
)(Yr − Ym), (2.2)
whereM is the number of nonrespondents in the population andN the size of the
target population, thus (MN ) is the nonresponse rate in the population. According
to Groves &Couper (2012, p.3) following the idea of a fixed percentage of nonre-
spondents in the population and a fixed difference between respondents and non-
respondents implies a view that ensures the reduction of nonresponse bias only by
increasing response rates.
Dropping the assumption of fixed sets of respondents and nonrespondents, the
8
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probabilisticmodel of nonresponse was developed (Bethlehem, 2002; Bethlehem
et al., 2011). Here the participation propensity ρk is introduced. All sample mem-
bers have an unknown propensity to participate. Nonresponse is the result of a
randomselection “…when an element…is selected in the sample, a randommech-
anism is activated that results with the probability ρk in response and ƾ − ρk in
nonresponse …” (Bethlehem et al., 2011, pp. 43). The process is assumed to be
random, as many factors determine the outcome, just a fraction of which can be
observed. The nonresponse bias of the unadjusted respondents mean can then be
written as
Yr = Ym +
σyρ
ρ
, (2.3)
where σyρ is the covariance between y, the variable of interest in the survey statistic
and ρ, the propensity to respond among units of the gross sample; and ρ, themean
of all response probabilities in the population. The covariance measures, the joint
variation of the variable of interest and the participation propensity and is given by
N∑
i=ƾ
(yi − y)(ρi − ρ)/(N− ƾ), (2.4)
where yi is the variable of interest for element i, y themeanof the variable of interest
in the population and ρi the propensity to respond for element i. This “implies that
when the likelihood of responding is strongly related to the variable of interest in
the survey, then nonresponse bias for the respondent mean will be large” (Groves
et al., 2013, p. 189). For nonresponse bias the size of nonresponse as well as the
correlation between the variables of interest are important. A large nonresponse
rate does not necessarily correspond to large nonresponse bias. Instead, the corre-
lation between the nonresponse propensity and the variables of interest has to be
examined (Groves, 2006).
For my research into the effect of incentives, the consequence of this research
is twofold. First, a reduction in nonresponse rates through incentive use is maybe
helpful in reducing the likelihoodofnonresponsebias. Secondly, increasing survey
participation does not necessarily correspond with a reduction in bias.
The effect of incentives has to be measured not only as its impact on the nonre-
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sponse rate but also on how it affects nonresponse bias.
2.2.3 The continuum of resistance: describing nonrespondents
Who are the sample members which are not taking part in the survey? And, most
importantly, how do we find out about their preferences and characteristics? As
seen above we need information about both respondents and nonrespondents to
get information on the size of the nonresponse bias.
Information on nonrespondents can sometimes be obtained from the sampling
frame, i.e. from information provided when the sample was drawn. This informa-
tion is valuable as it is available for both respondents and nonrespondents.
In the German survey context frame information is most often very limited as
samples are commonly drawn from registers or random route procedures are ap-
plied (e.g see chapter 5).
Sometimes samples are drawn fromgroups that allow access to rich data sources
like in the PASS survey (Trappmann et al., 2013) where an employment history
of sample members is available. But these are rare circumstances.
A different approach to find out information on nonrespondents are nonre-
sponse follow up studies. Here, in the event of noncooperation and noncontact,
sample members are approached with a shortened questionnaire to gain some in-
formation on the cases that will not be in the survey (Stoop, 2005). The infor-
mation from these short questionnaires can then be used to assess the size of the
bias. While the idea is intriguing there are many practical issues. In some scenar-
ios it might be unlawful to re-approach nonrespondents. In addition, interviewers
might be tempted to field the shorter nonresponse questionnaire instead of the
long form and thereby increase nonresponse.
Themainproblemwithnonresponse studies is that there is nonresponse innon-
response studies. Willingness to participate in such nonresponse surveys is often
very low asmost samplemembers have already refused the earlier survey requests.
Thus there might be nonresponse bias within the nonresponse survey itself.
A different approach to find out about nonrespondents is proposed with the
idea of a continuum of resistance to survey requests (Lin & Schaeffer, 1995). As-
suming every sample member has a fixed, determined, unobserved resistance to
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surveys. The higher the resistance, the harder it is to convince a respondent to
take part in a survey. It will take more effort, e.g. more calls, more visits and a
longer field time to get higher resistance sample members into the survey. Also it
is assumed that this resistance continuum correlates with variables of interest.
If these assumptions hold true, nonrespondents should have similar outcome
characteristics on said variables of interest as hard-to-reach respondents. Hard-to-
reach respondents are characterized by requiring lots of visits or calls, requiring
convincing strategies, maybe refusal conversion. Following the continuum theory
they rank relatively high on the resistance variable. Nonrespondents have even
higher values on this dimension, the increased field efforts that managed to reach
difficult cases was simply not enough to realize interviews with these cases. In
identifying these hard to reach cases we can isolate a subset of respondents that
is closest in characteristics to nonrespondents.
The continuumapproach is criticized for postulating heavy assumptions to hold
true (Stoop, 2005). Themost notable assumption is that interviewer effort is stan-
dardized and constant among all interviewers. This assumption will not hold in
practice given the high differences in effort and success between interviewers. The
assumptionof a fixed continuumof resistance towards all surveys under all circum-
stances is also hard to justify (Schnell, 1997). As we will see in the next section,
external factors play an important role in the decision to participate.
2.2.4 So, why do they respond? A very brief look at theories of sur-
vey participation
Explaining why sample members refuse to participate requires one to look at why
respondents participate at all. Therefore, I will very briefly describe theories used
to explain survey response in this section. The aim of this exercise is not to give a
full and exhaustive rundownof theories. Other authors havedone that already (Al-
baum et al., 1998; Schnell, 1997). Rather, in this section I want to outline theories
and frameworks often used to explain survey response especially in conjunction
with the use of incentives. These include social exchange theory, rational choice
theory, and leverage-salience theory.
Social exchange theory was proposed by Homans (1958) explaining the dy-
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namics of humanbehavior as exchangesbetweenactors. These actors analyze costs
and benefits of actions as well of expectations about certainty of returns to guide
their behavior. Applying the theory to survey research (Dillman, 1978), the costs
of answering a questionnaire were compared to the rewards, both non-monetary
andmonetary. In the application of the theory, the aspect of human interaction in
the survey situation is emphasized. While costs and benefits are important, bene-
fits and rewards can be drawn from the interaction itself. Dillman (1978) proposes
that the interaction of the survey response itself, for example the conversationwith
an interviewer or expressing one’s opinion can be rewarding in itself and outweigh
the costs of the interview. Survey incentives can play a role in the evaluation of
respondents costs and benefits. Nonetheless, exchange theory emphasizes the im-
portance of human interaction.
In an economic rational choice theory framework, actors choose alternative be-
haviors such that it maximizes their subjective expected utility. In the classic the-
ory, each and every alternative behavior option can be ranked by the actor accord-
ing to the costs and benefits expected. From these benefits costs of the chosen
alternative have to be deducted. Those can be direct costs, such as transportation
costs to reach a test center or (more likely) indirect costs or opportunity cost, such
as the opportunity costs of participating in a 90 minute household interview. Fi-
nally, the option maximizing the actors utility is chosen.
A direct consequence of this strict, classical formulation of this theory of action
is that a rational actor rarely participates in a survey. The direct or indirect bene-
fits of a typical survey are minimal to nonexistent and the (opportunity) costs of
taking a survey will always be present. Only if the opportunity costs are virtually
nonexistent (for example in the case of retirees, or the unemployed) survey partic-
ipation is possible.
If the strict assumptions are relaxed and the cognitive effort reducing framing
theory is assumed (Schnell, 1997), survey participation can be explained much
more easily. In this approach, actors can choose actions from a reduced set of ac-
tions instead of performing extensive cost/benefit- calculations. If a doorstep ap-
proach by a SHARE interviewer is framed in terms of ”helping out strangers”(e.g.
interviewers), the actor just performs according to a script and helps out the per-
son at their door.
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The reciprocity norm, in contrast, emphasizes the moral duty to help others in
return for a favor that has been provided. Small gifts or kind gestures evoke a feel-
ing of duty to reciprocate the favor towards the giver. These reciprocity norms are
believed to be universal and thus work across contexts, times and places (Gould-
ner, 1960). A survey request can be viewed in this context. Complying with the
request is most often a low cost situation to the respondent, a favor provided to an
interviewer or surveyorganization. Once theorganizationor the interviewer starts
the interaction with a kind gesture (e.g. an unconditional incentive), reciprocity
norm theory states that compliance with the following request is more likely.
The reciprocity norm is often cited when explanations for the effect of incen-
tives are being sought for (Singer et al., 2000). There are two major predictions
from this theory: one, incentives must be given unconditionally in advance to en-
courage respondents’ cooperation and two, it is essential that incentives have the
properties of a gift, a token of appreciation or a kind gesture. Only then can a re-
spondent mirror the gesture with her survey participation. In a test of the reci-
procity norm, Diekmann & Jann (2001) explicitly tested reciprocity theory. Pre-
paid telephone cards bearing the study design and photos of researchers were used
as incentives. The individual design and the use of real photos of the researchers in-
stead of stock photos enhanced the gift character of the incentive. Sending this gift
out in advance increased the participation rate and was interpreted as supporting
evidence for the validity of the reciprocity theory.
In an attempt to find a framework tailored to explaining survey participation
Groves et al. (2000) proposed Leverage-SalienceTheory. At the core of this con-
cept is a person’s underlying propensity to participate in a survey. On this propen-
sity continuum a threshold is assumed that has to be cleared in order for an actor
to participate in the survey. In order for the actor to make her decision regarding
survey participation, two additional concepts come into play. Leverage describes
the importance the sample person puts towards certain survey attributes. For ex-
ample, helping research could be a very positive experience for this person, while
not wasting her time is of prime importance.
The second concept, salience, is not influenced by the sample person but the
survey organization or the interviewer. It denotes how salient certain aspects of
the surveywill bemade to the respondent. An interviewermight tailor a interview
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in a way to make the top notch research conducted with the data very salient and
downplay the dreaded length of the interview.
By tailoring the survey approach in this way, the interviewer is more likely to re-
alize an interview with the sampled person: Factors that make the interviewmore
appealing are beingmademore salient and the reverse is true for aspects with neg-
ative leverage. Survey incentives can help in this framework if high leverage is at-
tached to them and they aremade salient to the respondents when the interviewer
is making the survey pitch.
To sum up I showed how survey participation can be explained and what role
survey incentives play in these theories. All theories predict respondent incentives
to increase survey participation rate, only the mechanisms of how incentives im-
prove response rates differ.
Exchange theory and reciprocity norm focuses on the social interaction of ex-
change as such. The more a situation is built like an exchange the more likely
the success, meaning survey participation. Rational choice theory and leverage
salience theory emphasize theweightingof benefits andcostswhendeciding about
survey participation. In leverage salience theory there is an emphasis on the role
of the design features and how important these are to respondents.
In the next section past research on incentives will be presented.
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3
Previous research on incentives in survey
research
In this chapter I will discuss earlier research on incentives.
Generally, the term incentive is used to describe a benefit given to an actor in or-
der tonudgehim towards a desiredbehavior. In economics, incentives are a central
concept when explaining behavior and options of actors (see e.g. Mankiw, 2004;
Sowell, 2007). Incentives can be the result of existing structures (e.g. norms) or
take on the formof deliberate planned action like laws, fines or benefits. Assuming
that actors behave to maximize their utility, the description of an incentive struc-
ture of said actors is the foundation to explaining their behavior.
Whenmanipulating the incentive structure of actors, cost efficiency is a guiding
principle. Providing changes to the incentive structure should come with a return
to the actor paying for the incentive.
There aremanyparallels to theway survey researchers use the term incentive. By
providing an incentive a change or reassurance in a certain behavior (compliance
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with the survey request) is intended and the incentive gift should be beneficial to
the survey sponsor,meaning survey incentives should be cost efficient. When pay-
ing for incentives, survey organizations aim to gain a return they otherwise would
not have obtained given budget restrictions.
Incentives used in survey research are used in many forms, modes and values.
In this section, I provide an overview of incentive use in survey research. When
considering incentives, these are defined as a gift to a sample person in a survey
somehow connected to his or her survey participation: a pen offered at an inter-
view, a $5 note included in an advance letter or a personalized ticket to a charitable
lottery handed out by the interviewer after the interview. Many studies have exam-
ined the effects of the administration of different types of incentives in surveys.
In this dissertation, I will focus on respondent incentives and not consider in-
centives to interviewers or other survey organization staff. In addition, most in-
centives are not a payment or an expense allowance, the incentives described here
have a gift character. That does not mean that they are of low value to the respon-
dent. Just that the framing of the transaction is that of a gift or a token of appre-
ciation rather than a business transaction. Also, I will primarily discuss findings
of experiments in interviewer-mediated studies as this is most relevant to my own
research.
To categorize the diverse research findings on incentive effects in surveys, I
choose 8 categories to order the findings. A summary of studies and categories
can be found in table 3.0.1.
In the first category I group studies investigating the effect of offering incentives
compared to no incentives.
The second category contains studies comparing monetary incentives to non-
monetary, in-kind incentives.
Studies on the optimal value of incentives make up the third category.
Studies in the forth category report effects of the payout form of monetary in-
centives such as cash, checks or vouchers.
In the fifth category I grouped studies discussing the payout timing of incen-
tives, comparing prepaid or unconditional incentives to postpaid or conditional
incentives.
Studies of incentives targeted towards a specific subgroup of respondents are
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Table 3.0.1: Overview of studies discussed by incentive mode
No Effects tested Studies
1 Main effect of
incentives
Blohm&Koch (2013), Castiglioni et al. (2008),
Church (1993), Pforr et al. (2015),
Schröder et al. (2013),
Singer, Hoewyk, et al. (1999), Singer & Ye (2013)
2 In-kind and
monetary
incentives
Church (1993), Diekmann & Jann (2001),
Gendall & Healey (2008), Ryu et al. (2005),
Singer, Hoewyk, et al. (1999)
3 Optimal incentive
value
Börsch-Supan, Krieger, & Schröder (2013),
Scherpenzeel & Toepoel (2012),
Schröder et al. (2013),
Singer, Hoewyk, et al. (1999),
Yu & Cooper (1983), Martin et al. (2014),
Zagorsky & Rhoton (2008),Hsu et al. (2017),
Mercer et al. (2015), Hanly et al. (2014)
4 Payment
transaction: cash,
check, voucher
Birnholtz et al. (2004),
Börsch-Supan, Krieger, & Schröder (2013),
Gajic et al. (2010), Hogan (2009),
Schröder et al. (2013), Singer & Ye (2013),
Warriner et al. (1996)
5 Prepaid versus
promised
incentives
Börsch-Supan, Krieger, & Schröder (2013),
Castiglioni et al. (2008), Church (1993),
Gelman et al. (2003),
Scherpenzeel & Toepoel (2012),
Singer, Hoewyk, et al. (1999),
Kretschmer &Müller (2017),Hsu et al. (2017)
6 Targeted incentives Abreu &Winters (1999), Cyffka et al. (2012),
Juster & Suzman (1995), Kay et al. (2001),
Laurie & Lynn (2009), Olsen (2005),
Rodgers (2011),
Singer, Groves, & Corning (1999)
7 Incentives in
longitudinal
surveys
Booker et al. (2011), Castiglioni et al. (2008),
Goldenberg et al. (2009), Jäckle & Lynn (2008),
Laurie & Lynn (2009), Singer et al. (1998),
Pforr et al. (2015); Singer & Ye (2013)
8 Incentive use in
Germany
Pforr et al. (2015), Schröder et al. (2013)
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grouped in category six. Category seven summarizes the incentive use in longitu-
dinal surveys.
Finally, I look into the use of incentives in Germany.
3.1 Using incentives compared to no incentives
Incentives are widely used in survey research to facilitate contact and cooperation
with a survey request (Church, 1993). When studying their effectiveness the basic
question is whether these incentives have any effect on survey outcomes in terms
of response rates and resulting sample composition (Church, 1993; Pforr et al.,
2015; Singer & Bossarte, 2006). Experimental research in the use of incentives
has a long tradition (Armstrong, 1975). The effect of incentives to increase par-
ticipation rates is well replicated across numerous surveys, countries and survey
modes (Singer, Hoewyk, et al., 1999). The overall finding is that incentives tend
to improve response rates in surveys (Singer & Ye, 2013).
In a meta-study Church (1993) finds that offering an incentive increases re-
sponse rates on average by 13.2 percentage points across the 38 mail studies that
were examined. Studies were identified using two databases (Sociological Ab-
stracts, PsychologicalAbstracts) aswell as two Journals (PublicOpinionQuarterly
and Journal ofMarketing Research) and included references to response rates and
incentives. In addition, theses studies contained a control group. As a caveat he
notes that the overall effect of increased response rates due to incentive is largely
mediated by the type of incentive treatment (See subsections 3.2 and 3.5).
Translating these findings from mail to interviewer mediated surveys, Singer,
Hoewyk, et al. (1999) conducted ameta-analysis of 39 experiments in face-to-face
and telephone studies. Using an incentive increased response rates. “On average,
each dollar of incentive paid results in about a third of percentage point difference
between incentive and the zero-incentive condition”(Singer, Hoewyk, et al., 1999,
p. 223). The findings are robust when controlling for the characteristics of the
incentive and burden of the study. This effect is also reported in a review article
by Singer & Ye (2013) for numerous studies. Note that most of the studies were
conducted by mail or by telephone and the evidence on large scale face-to-face
studies is more limited (Pforr et al., 2015).
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In a face-to-face study, the German Allbus survey, Blohm & Koch (2013) re-
port a significant 3.6 percentage point difference when testing no incentive versus
a promisede 10 cash incentive.
Contrary to these findings, the pilot study of the German Family Panel (pair-
fam), theMinipanel, did not find an incentive effect (Castiglioni et al., 2008). 600
Respondents were approached in four cities with a survey request to partake in
the Minipanel study. Shopping vouchers valued at e 10 were offered prepaid or
promised to random subsets of the sample and can be compared to a no incentive
group. In the first wave, no significant difference between the incentive and the no
incentive conditions were observed.
In some experiments the no incentive condition is not even tested as no incen-
tive is not seen as a viable option for survey research (e.g. Schröder et al., 2013).
Overall, the literature finds that incentives improve response rates in surveys.
3.2 Monetary incentives and in-kind incentives
There are monetary and non-monetary, in-kind incentives. Monetary incentives
have a clear monetary value attached such as cash or a check. But incentives can
also come in the form of gifts or presents. These objects like a pen or a stuffed an-
imal do not come with a clear monetary value attached. An intermediate form of
incentives are incentives such as store vouchers, stamps or phone cards. As store
vouchers can be used like cash I will discuss them asmonetary incentives. The us-
ability of stamps and phone cards is limited to the postal service or a phone com-
pany, therefore I will regard them as in-kind incentives, though this might depend
on the cultural context. In many African countries phone cards are used for trans-
ferring money across long distances (see e.g. Meuleman et al. (2017))
In-kind incentives are often used at the beginning of the interaction with re-
spondents. The German Socio-Economic Panel for example used these kinds of
incentives called “door opener” (Schröder et al., 2013). Here interviewers have a
budget to pay for these presents and it is at their discretion if and which incentives
they use.
In other studies, gifts like a pen or an elaborated mix of children’s toys are the
only incentives (DeLuca&Lipps, 2005) (N. Biedinger, personal communication,
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14.2.2014). The rationale behind the decision not to use cash can be justified
with norms of reciprocity. Offering a small, symbolic present to the respondent
is thought to improve the likeliness to return a favor. This interaction is perceived
not tobe aneconomic exchangebut amere gestureof kindness (Diekmann&Jann,
2001).
In a rare controlled experiment testing of in-kind against monetary incentives,
Ryuet al. (2005) confirmedcash incentives tobemore effective in raising response
rates than in-kind incentives. Accordingly, themeta-studies byChurch (1993) and
Singer, Hoewyk, et al. (1999) report that monetary incentives are more effective
in raising response rates than in-kind incentives.
When faced with new regulations of the postal service which forbid sending
cash via mail, Gendall & Healey (2008) experimented with the use of in-kind
incentives to replace their former $1 incentive. In-kind incentives improved re-
sponse rates but not with the consistency and to the same level as cash incentives.
In todays research practice in the social sciences, cash incentives can be observed
muchmore commonly than in-kind incentives (Pforr et al., 2015; Singer,Hoewyk,
et al., 1999; Singer & Ye, 2013). In addition to the greater effect on response rates
they are easier to obtain, store, ship and return.
3.3 What is the optimal value of incentives?
The effect of different values of incentives on the response rate has also been re-
searched, especially in face-to-face and telephone modes. Finding the optimal in-
centive amount is a crucial question when trying to optimize a research budget.
Theprimary research questionwhen studying the effect of the incentive value is
thus: What is the relationship between incentive value and response rate and non-
response bias? And is there a monotonous relationship between incentive value
and response rate? Or, conversely, will high incentive values diminish the effect of
incentives as respondents may feel pressured, coerced or bribed?
In a meta-analysis, Church (1993) finds a strong relationship between the cash
value of incentives and response rates. He does not find indications of a dimin-
ishing return of higher incentive values. This finding is replicated in the Singer,
Hoewyk, et al. (1999) study on findings from interviewer-mediated surveys. They
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find that “each dollar of incentive paid results in about a third of a percentage
point difference between the incentive and the zero-incentive condition” (Singer,
Hoewyk, et al., 1999, p. 223). This finding also holds when examining the effect
of the incentive value by comparing the highest versus the lowest incentive condi-
tion. Similar linear increases in response rates by incentive value can also be found
in Yu &Cooper (1983).
However, other studies have foundnonlinear effects. Whenexperimentingwith
the recruitment procedures of the Longitudinal Internet Studies for the Social sci-
ences (LISS) panel, Scherpenzeel & Toepoel (2012) found ae 20 prepaid incen-
tive to yield a similar effect size as a e 10 prepaid incentive. The odds ratio of
registering versus not registering for the LISS panel was even 0.21 points lower
for the highe 50 prepaid incentives than for thee 10 prepaid incentives (1.76 vs.
1.97). These findings lead to the conclusion that theremight be incentives that are
too large, having negative effects on respondents motivation to participate. The
analysis by Scherpenzeel & Toepoel (2012) also includes a report on the cost ef-
fectiveness of recruitment incentives in terms of the response rate. This analysis
indicates thate 10 aremore cost efficient than no incentive,e 20 ore 50. Exper-
imenting with even lower incentive values, e 5 respondent incentives performed
slightly better than offering e 10 in the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP)
(Schröder et al., 2013). When increasing incentives incrementally from $0 to $10
in an RDD survey, Trussell & Lavrakas (2004) found no significant increase in
response rate between $1 and $5, but significant increases above $5. A similar re-
sult was achieved in the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia
(HILDA) pilot study incentive experiment, where a e 25 incentive resulted in a
27 percentage points higher response rate compared to ae 10 incentive (Hanly et
al., 2014). In ae 20 vs. e 40 experiment during an ongoing panel study, Zagorsky
&Rhoton (2008) find the high incentive group to perform better in terms of com-
pletion rate. The survey was conducted to ensure cooperation in a longitudinal
survey among those that previously refused to participate. A monotonous effect
of incentive value was also found by Börsch-Supan, Krieger, & Schröder (2013)
where ae 40 condition performed better than ae 20 ore 10 incentive condition
(all prepaid, see chapter 7). This finding is also supportedby the 2010PIAACGer-
many field test experiment, where response rates increased with incentive value.
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Thee 50 condition provided the highest response rate (Martin et al., 2014).
Hsu et al. (2017) also find a monotonously increasing relationship between in-
centive value and response rate, comparing a $150 dollar postpaid incentive com-
pared to $50 and $100 conditions. Nonetheless in a meta-analysis of incentive
experiments, Mercer et al. (2015) find a “strong nonlinear effect of incentives”.
While response rates improve with higher incentive values, there are diminishing
returns with high incentives. Important moderating factors in the analysis are sur-
vey mode and time of payment.
The results of this overview aremixed. Whilemost individual studies andmeta-
studies report that larger incentive values result in larger response rates, some stud-
ies report the largest response rates in median incentive conditions or no effect of
incentive value. The effect of incentive value seems to be moderated by many fac-
tors in fielded surveys. A pretest experiment is advisedwhendrafting a new survey.
Overall the literature supports the notion that there is a monotonously positive
relationship between incentive value and response rates (with some exceptions).
There is support for the notion that there is a diminishing return for high incentive
values. Special consideration should be given to cost effectiveness of the incentive
value as evidence is sparse on this question (Gelman et al., 2003; Scherpenzeel &
Toepoel, 2012).
3.4 Different forms of monetary incentives: cash, check,
voucher and lotteries
Money can change hands in different ways: cash, written checks, use of a credit
card or vouchers, and in many other ways. In the same way monetary incentives
can be handed over to a respondent in many different forms. Different modes
of payment can feel different to the respondent and invoke different reactions. A
check or a voucher is not as direct and universal as a bank note. A prepaid credit
card imprinted with a pleasant picture and the surveys’ logo however may poten-
tially be remembered better than a wire transfer. Even though there might be rea-
sons to suspect different effects of different transfer modes of incentives, there has
been little research into the matter.
In a direct test of a cash incentive versus a gift voucher both worth $5, Birnholtz
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et al. (2004) found that cash incentives yield the higher response rate for new and
repeat participants in a web survey. In field practice, however, the choice of pay-
ment mode seems to be guided more by issues of handling and available methods
than by the effectiveness of the mode.
Using checks or prepaid credit cards also provides the practical advantage that
funds form uncashed checks or unused prepaid credit cards will be paid back to
the survey organization as reported by Hogan (2009) (provided legal, ethical and
budgetary regulations do not interfere). But as the effect of payment mode is un-
clear, more experimental research in this area is necessary.
A special case of monetary incentives are lotteries, as a monetary value can be
attached to the prize but that value might be misidentified by the respondents. In
spite of early evidence against the use of lotteries publishedunder the the program-
matic title “Charities, no; Lotteries, no; Cash, yes” (Warriner et al., 1996), lotteries
are still being used in survey research. Gajic et al. (2010) confirmed amodest pre-
paid incentive to perform better than two lottery conditions in a sequential mixed
mode survey (mail/online). When comparing three conditions to each other, of-
fering a high $250 lottery win worked better than the $25 lottery win. However, a
third condition, a $2 prepaid cash incentive was the most cost efficient. Lotteries
remain in web surveys as they tend to be the least expensive incentive option. In
their review Singer & Ye (2013) conclude that lotteries show small positive effects
in comparison to no incentive groups and that “lotteries (prize draws) are nomore
effective inWeb surveys than they are in other kinds of surveys”(Singer&Ye, 2013,
p. 125). Lottery incentive schemes should therefore be used with caution. In the
German survey context, large scale surveys havemoved away from the established
use of charitable lotteries as an incentive in recent years (Börsch-Supan, Krieger,
& Schröder, 2013; Schröder et al., 2013).
3.5 When to pay out incentives: in advance or after the
survey?
When to offer the incentives is a continuous debate: right with the survey request
or upon completion of the survey. Offering an incentive with no strings attached
with the survey request is usually called an unconditional or prepaid incentive or
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very rarely pre-incentive. When the handout of incentives is conditional on survey
completion they are typically called conditional, postpaid or promised incentives.
The reason for choosing between those payment moments can be a practical
one. Itmay simply be impossible to offer an incentive on first contact (for example,
in telephone surveys without address frame) or legal regulations may not allow
sending a gift in advance. In addition, the net cost of incentives may be lower with
conditional incentives, as they are paid out only to the smaller subset of the sample
that responded to the survey request. A final advantage of conditional incentives
is that the logic of the interaction (an effort is followed by a reward) is familiar to
respondents fromeveryday lifewhereas unconditional incentives reverse that logic
and may therefore be regarded as unconventional.
When going back to the theory of action underlying the response process, sup-
port for both approaches can be found. An unconditional incentive emphasizes
the role of the incentive as a gift, a token of appreciation. The rationale behind this
mode is to evoke the reciprocity norm in the respondent and encourage her/him
to participate. In contrast, an incentive paid on condition of survey participation
playsmore into the general exchange frame: The respondent is receiving a good in
exchange for a service.
In experiments testing the effectiveness of unconditional incentives against con-
ditional incentives most studies find unconditional incentives to perform better
than conditional incentives, but the reverse result can also be found in the litera-
ture. Thepositive effect of prepayment is reported inmeta-studies. Church (1993)
reports an average increase in response rates of 19.1 percentage points for uncon-
ditional monetary incentives whereas that average increase was only 4.5 percent-
age points when using postpaid incentives (t=3.67). In the review study of Singer,
Hoewyk, et al. (1999) the effect of prepayment is positive when controlling for
incentive size and other characteristics but fails to reach significance.
In a reanalysis of the metadata collected by Singer, Hoewyk, et al. (1999), Gel-
man et al. (2003) refine the model used and include interactions of time of pay-
ment and other characteristics in the analysis (burden, value, mode, form). As
a result they find an interaction of value and incentive. Unconditional incentives
have “a higher effect per dollar compared to postpaying” (Gelman et al., 2003, p.
217).
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Support for the positive effect of unconditional incentives can also be found in
review articles by Booker et al. (2011) and Edwards et al. (2005). Looking at in-
dividual studies, I can illustrate those mixed reviews. When setting up the Dutch
LISS panel, only prepaid incentive conditions had a significant (positive) effect
on panel registration compared to promised incentives (Scherpenzeel & Toepoel,
2012). When experimenting to find the incentive scheme for the pairfam Study
conditional incentives performed better than unconditional incentives, both in
the first interview and in subsequent follow-up waves (Castiglioni et al., 2008).
Contrary to this, in the face-to-face recruitment for the German Internet Panel,
unconditional incentives returned an about 9 percentage points higher response
rate than conditional incentives (t=5.14) in spite of the value of the conditional
incentive being twice as large (e 10 vs. e 5, see chapter 5).
As mentioned above, the net cost of prepaid incentives is higher than that of
promised incentives. Therefore, for survey practitioners, the question of cost ef-
ficiency will be raised. Do the improved results justify the higher net costs? The
question is not an easy one to answer as the value of additional survey participants
is hard tomeasure. When analyzing the total cost of registering participants for the
LISS panel Scherpenzeel & Toepoel (2012) conclude that thee 10 value and of-
fering the incentiveunconditionally is themost cost efficient. Gelmanet al. (2003)
conclude that postpaid incentives will bemore cost efficient for their survey situa-
tion. Thequestion of cost efficiency is far frombeing solved, especiallywhen going
beyond response rates and examining questions of data quality and fieldwork ef-
fort.
Unconditional incentives can be viewed as an unconventional approach. This
is especially the case for Germany, where prepaid incentives have not been used
until recently. This can lead to a higher number of calls to the survey hotline as
experienced in the SHARE Germany wave 4 survey (Börsch-Supan, Krieger, &
Schröder, 2013). As a result of an experiment conducted with unconditional in-
centives in this panel wave the number of calls to the hotline was about 3 percent-
age points higher with prepaid incentive compared to the conditional incentive.
There is no indication that overall surveys suffer from these complaints, but prac-
titioners must be aware of this consequence of unconditional incentives and plan
accordingly with advising hotline staff and sponsors.
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Prepaid and postpaid incentives can also be combined. In theNEPSWave 6 in-
centive experiment a random half of sample members were switched from ae 20
postpaid to ae 10 prepaid combinedwith ae 10 postpaid incentive (Kretschmer
& Müller, 2017). The combined post- and prepaid incentive treatment yielded
higher response rates, amore balanced sample, and reduced fieldwork effort. Also,
Hsu et al. (2017) report higher response rates when combining promised incen-
tives with a notification postcard and a $ 5 prepaid incentive.
In summary, most studies find that prepaid incentives result in higher response
rates than postpaid incentives. The theoretical explanation that this is due to evok-
ing the reciprocity norm which works better than a payment frame highlighted by
postpaid incentives is compelling. But survey research lacks theory to explain the
circumstances of why prepaid incentives sometimes perform worse than postpaid
incentives.
3.6 Targeted incentives
In previous sections, incentives were paid out to all respondents of a survey in the
sameway. However, survey organizations can also use different incentive schemes
to target different subgroups of respondents.
Higher incentivesmay be paid out to a hard to reach population or an additional
gift could be offered to initial nonrespondents or sleepers in a panel survey or used
to aid with the refusal conversion of reluctant respondents. This is called targeted
or differential incentives. In this section, I will discuss evidence on the use of tar-
geted incentives and discuss the ethics or fairness of such incentive use.
When discussing targeted incentives ethical questions are often examined. Re-
spondents are treated unequally (Laurie & Lynn, 2009). For example late or re-
luctant respondents may receive higher incentives or gifts. Inadvertently, surveys
thus reward unwanted behavior like a late response or skipping a panel wave. Man-
agers of both German large survey organizations carrying out face-to-face surveys
have therefore repeatedly expressed their unwillingness to use targeted incentives,
citing ethical concerns.
In a paper by Singer, Groves, & Corning (1999) perceptions on targeted in-
centives were examined. In a two-stage survey differential incentives were used
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to convert reluctant respondents from the first stage. In the second stage, an ex-
periment about disclosing this practice to respondents was carried out. It became
clear that most people think targeted incentives are being used and the majority
of respondents feel that these targeted incentives are unfair. In practice, the dis-
closure of differential incentives made no difference to response propensity. “We
conclude that respondents are sensitive to issues of fairness in the distribution of
incentives, but that these issues are not especially salient, nor are they prominent
among the factors thatmotivate survey participation” (Singer, Groves, &Corning,
1999, p. 259).
There is evidence about the success of differential incentives paid to increase
the likelihood of reluctant respondents in a survey. In the first wave of the Health
and Retirement Study in the USA (HRS), nonrespondents were targeted with in-
creased incentives. The initial incentive was $10 for individuals and $30 if both
partners of a couple participated. Dividing nonrespondents into two experimen-
tal groups and a control group, different treatments were tested: Incentives were
doubled for the first group ($20 for individuals /$60 for couples) and raised to
$100 for individuals ($200, for couples) for the second group. The control group
received no additional incentives. The interventions were successful in converting
households into HRS participants. The sample composition analysis showed that
the treatments were successful in getting important respondents into the survey to
balance out the sample (Juster & Suzman, 1995).
In the LISS panel study, incentives were used to target so called sleepers, pan-
ellists that did not complete questionnaires for three consecutive months (Scher-
penzeel, 2014). Offering ae 30 unconditional incentive increased the percentage
of re-activated sleepers by 12 percentage points compared to a no incentive con-
trol. group (44% versus 32%). Thee 10 conditional incentive group was almost
as successful (43% versus 32%, %d=11) in increasing re-activation rates but at a
much lower cost than thee 30 condition.
In the Survey of ProgramDynamics 2000data collection debit cards valued $40
were successfully used. Respondents that showed signs of an initial refusal during
the doorstep approach were immediately offered the debit card to avoid refusal
(Kay et al., 2001). Unfortunately, the direct effect of the treatment is not provided
in the paper, but evidence reported in the paper indicates the success of the treat-
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ment: My own calculations show a 34 percentage points increase in response rates
among reluctant respondents when using the incentive compared to not using an
incentive. However, much is left unclear in the paper, for example which part of
the assignments were at random andwhich on condition of previous participation
in the study. Results from this study should thus be treated with caution.
For successful examples of refusal conversion see also the studies by Abreu &
Winters (1999) using the Survey on Income and ProgrammParticipation and the
experimental study by Cyffka et al. (2012), where targeting reluctant respondents
with cash incentives increased participation.
In summary, differential incentives are being usedmainly for refusal conversion.
These interventions are successful in that they bring nonrespondents, sleepers or
reluctant respondents (back) into the survey. Taken together with the findings by
Rodgers (2011) that increased targeted incentives do not create an expectation or
disappointment when incentive amounts converge back to normal, differential in-
centives can be regarded as a valid and cost efficient tool to counter decreasing re-
sponse rates (Olsen, 2005). It is noteworthy that experimental evidence is mostly
from the United States; the cross-cultural compatibility of such an intervention
needs to be tested.
3.7 Incentives in panel surveys
Panel surveys are surveys that approach the same sample unit longitudinally with
survey requests. In contrast to cross-sectional surveys, the survey panel request is
thus not a unique event but a repeated one. When faced with the survey request,
respondents can therefore use past experiences with the survey organization as a
reference point for their decision to take part in a survey or not. Some respon-
dents stay loyal to a panel survey, they have formed a close relationship with the
survey enterprise. Furthermore, the use of incentives can be put in reference to
past incentive treatments by the respondents. It is therefore not unlikely that in-
centive effects may differ in longitudinal surveys as their effect may accumulate
over time ormay be diminished by the personal relationship of respondents to the
survey that has grownover time. Researchers examining incentives in longitudinal
surveys are typically interested in the effect of incentive change over time and the
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effect of continuous incentive offerings.
Increasing the incentive amount by £3 from wave 13 to wave 14 of the British
Household Panel Study (BHPS) significantly increased the cooperation rate in
wave 14. This effect was especially strong among those that did not respond to
wave13(Laurie&Lynn, 2009). As retainingparticipants andmotivating reluctant
respondents are very important challenges to longitudinal surveys, a small increase
in incentive value may help master these challenges.
Keeping respondent incentives and treatment groups constant over the three-
waves preliminary study of the pairfam, Castiglioni et al. (2008) found offering a
e 10 gift voucher to significantly increase participation over time compared with
offering no incentive: the conditional incentive outperformed the unconditional
incentive. Carrying out a rather complex incentive experiment on the Youth Co-
hort Study of England and Wales, Jäckle & Lynn (2008) found incentives to be
a valid tool for maintaining sample size and data quality over time. The positive
effects on retention did not differ across subgroups of the sample. Incentive treat-
ment groups however, showed larger levels of item nonresponse.
An experimental factor unique to longitudinal incentives is the possibility to
change the value of incentives over time. In a test of the effect of decreasing in-
centives Singer et al. (1998) found no negative effects - respondents did not react
negatively when the expected incentives were no longer offered.
Evidence from the Consumer Expenditure Survey, a rolling panel of consumer
behavior in the USA, Goldenberg et al. (2009) found $40 to result in higher ini-
tial response rates than $20 or no incentive. The incentive was payed out uncon-
ditionally prior to the first wave of the panel. Throughout the five waves of the
panel the $40 group showed the highest response rates. In addition, the $40 group
performed best on indicators of fieldwork effort, for example contact attempts or
number of personal visits needed to complete an interview.
In a systematic comparison of 28 population-based studies covering health out-
comes Booker et al. (2011) found incentive effects to be reported in ten studies.
The authors find evidence for increased participation rates with higher incentive
values.
When summarizing the state of the literature on the effect of incentives in lon-
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gitudinal surveys, a well cited statement 1 is “…limited knowledge of what the op-
timum strategies are for any given design and whether or how incentive strategies
translate into improvements in the accuracy of estimation over the longer term”
(Laurie & Lynn, 2009). I, however, conclude that the evidence supports the pos-
itive effects of incentives in longitudinal surveys. It is true that the effects are even
more inconsistent than in cross-sectional surveys. This is most likely due to lon-
gitudinal surveys being very diverse in terms of fieldwork efforts, population and
survey goals, even more so than surveys carried out at a single point in time.
3.8 The use of incentives in Germany
While many incentive studies have been conducted in the United States, there has
been little research on the use of incentives in Germany. This is especially true for
face-to-face surveys (see Pforr et al., 2015, for a comprehensive discussion). His-
torically, incentives were not used or discussed as widely in Germany as in some
other countries: Incentives are mentioned only in passing in one of the two lead-
ing German survey methods text books (Diekmann, 2006; Schnell et al., 2013).
Against thebackdropof decreasing response rates inGermany in thepast years sur-
vey managers began to systematically research and think about incentives. A typi-
cal example of this survey context is the case of the SOEP.The incentives scheme
was changed from using a charitable lottery in combination with doorstep incen-
tives at the discretion of the interviewer to postpaid cash incentives. Also experi-
mental studieswith the SOEPhave been carried out (for an overview see Schröder
et al., 2013).
Germany being late to the game when it comes to survey incentives poses prac-
tical challenges and promotes a research question. The practical challenges arise
when making the case for incentive use in communication with survey sponsors,
university administrators, commercial survey agencies or respondents. As incen-
tives are relatively new and unconventional there is often an element of surprise
when faced with survey incentives. In addition, problems and potential risks and
drawbacks of the method are brought forward. Administrators feel respondents
1 Cited in Pforr et al. (2015); Singer & Ye (2013).
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have to sign receipts for incentives or refuse the notion of incentive payments al-
together. Survey sponsors have to come up with additional funds for incentives
and an increased budget. When dealing with commercial survey organizations I
have encountered a general skepticism about the usefulness and practical admin-
istration of incentives. Last but not least, there is a considerable opposition to (es-
pecially) cash incentives coming from respondents. A small but vocal minority of
the sample members complain about receiving cash incentives. This is especially
prominent with prepaid incentives. In their complaints, these respondents pre-
dominately challenge the legality of the cash offering or complain about their tax
money being wasted or a combination of both. It is hard to quantify the number
of these complaints but I will take a closer look at this issue in chapter 7.
The research question then is whether the results from studies in other coun-
tries can be generalized and transferred to Germany. As cross cultural differences
in field methods are well documented (e.g. Blom et al., 2010) the effects of incen-
tives might be different in Germany than in other countries. In a comparison of
known evidence of research on incentives in large face-to-face studies inGermany,
Pforr et al. (2015) reported the results of incentive experiments on eight surveys
in Germany, including two studies presented in this volume. The experiments ex-
amined different aspects of incentive treatments: prepaid vs. postpaid, lotteries,
and incentive value. The consensus in the literature is that incentives increase re-
sponse rates in the surveys examined. The authors find some support for larger
cash values performing better, especially large sums. Overall, prepaid incentives
have a stronger effect than conditional incentives. Finally, the authors identify the
area of nonresponse bias as an area that has not been studied well enough yet.
Existing research carefully suggests that incentives affect survey results in a sim-
ilar way as has been shown in the literature on surveys based in the United States.
Nonetheless, researchers should proceed with caution when using incentives as
acceptance with respondents can’t be generally assumed.
3.9 Lessons from past research
In summary, the literature finds that incentives are an able tool to improve sur-
vey participation. Across survey and incentive modes, incentive conditions tend
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to outperform control groups when it comes to survey response. In general, larger
sums of prepaid cash incentives have the strongest effects on response rates. But
experiments on incentives use very different surveys as vehicles, with different tar-
get populations, topics and survey environments. As all of these factors influence
the outcomes of the surveys, comparing results from incentive experiments is dif-
ficult. To a survey practitioner it is difficult to give general recommendations. I
suggest including an experiment in the pretest to find out how incentives work in
a particular context and to address issues specific to the respective survey (Scher-
penzeel & Toepoel, 2012).
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4
Data used in the dissertation
4.1 Survey ofHealth, Ageing and Retirement in Europe
The Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE) is a multi-
disciplinary and cross-national European research infrastructure collecting longi-
tudinal micro data in 27 European countries and Israel (Börsch-Supan, Brandt,
et al., 2013). The project is mainly funded by the European Union. The project
runs a biannually computer assisted face-to-face survey of the population of par-
ticipating countries aged 50 years and over. The main topics covered in SHARE
are health, socioeconomic status and social networks (see Börsch-Supan& Jürges,
2005). Six panel waves with more than 120,000 participating individuals have
been completed so far, with a seventh wave starting in 2018 (SHARE - Survey of
Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe, 2017).
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4.1.1 Sampling
SHARE consists of country samples and sampling procedures can vary between
countries. For most countries a population register is being used, but in some
countries those are not available (Lynn et al., 2013). As national deviations in
sampling have to be accounted for, the central coordination assures that compara-
ble probability samples are being drawn in all SHARE countries.
Excluded from the target population aged 50 plus are those in institutions or
those that cannot speak the country’s language(s)(Börsch-Supan, Brandt, et al.,
2013). In addition to the target population, the SHARE survey has a household
component. Current partners living in the household of sample members are el-
igible for a SHARE interview, irregardless of their own age. All those that have
been interviewed in past SHAREwaves are followed and interviewed in following
SHARE waves if they do not move abroad (Lynn et al., 2013).
Tomaintain sample size over time, SHARE countries can add refreshment sam-
ples to their panel sample. The data used in this dissertation are from the SHARE
Germany wave 4 refreshment sample. This refreshment sample had a target size of
4,000 individuals based on a register sample. The sample was drawn in two stages.
In the first sampling stage, 200 municipalities were selected with a selection prob-
ability proportional to their population size of persons aged 50 years or older. This
resulted in 219 primary sampling units (PSUs) as large cities were included with
more than one PSU (Lynn et al., 2013, p. 98). In the second stage, 44 individuals
were sampled per PSU resulting in a gross sample of 9,636 units. The age cohorts
born 1957 to 1960 were oversampled to better match the existing baseline sample
of SHAREGermany (Lynn et al., 2013).
4.1.2 Interviewing
SHARE fieldwork is done in person by interviewers face-to-face. Interviewing is
contracted to local survey agencies.
The SHARE questionnaire is programmed by the SHARE coordination team
to harmonize the fieldwork instrument for SHARE countries. From a common
generic questionnaire localized versions are translated with the help of software
tools and translation guidelines (Wijnant et al., 2013).
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Fieldwork of the German wave 4 SHARE was contracted to the Infas institute
(MEA - Max Planck Institute for Social Law and Social Policy, 2017). Survey in-
terviewers are trained following a program provided by the SHARE core team.
Fieldwork is coordinated, recorded and controlled by the use of the SHARE sam-
ple management system. In this way SHARE coordination assures interviewing
standards are met and information on fieldwork progress is collected in a timely
fashion.
SHARE data is generally made available to the scientific community as a re-
search infrastructure free of charge via the website share-project.org. Note how-
ever that the data used in this publication is not included in the public releases but
is made available on site at SHARE in Munich upon request (MEA - Max Planck
Institute for Social Law and Social Policy, 2017).
4.2 TheGerman Internet Panel (GIP)
The GIP is an infrastructure project of the Collaborative Research Center SFB
884 ”Political Economy of Reforms” at theUniversity ofMannheim funded by the
German Research Fund (DFG). The project runs an ongoing online panel study
based on a strict probability sample of the German population. Its aim is to pro-
vide a vessel for researchers of the center to collect data on individuals’ preferences
and opinions on reforms inGermany and the change of theses opinions over time.
There have been two recruitment phases in 2012 and 2014 (Blom et al., 2015).
The 2012 recruitment of the GIP, which I will use in my analyses, implemented
two incentive experiments that are ideally suited to research the question of ef-
fects of incentives on sample composition. In the following, I will only discuss the
2012 recruitment as only this procedure is relevant for the work described in this
dissertation.
4.2.1 Sampling
The GIP 2012 study is based on a probability sample of the general population
born between 1937 and 1996. The sampling design was composed in three steps:
A stratified random selection of PSUs, a listing of households from a random start-
ing address in each sample point, and a random selection of listed households.
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In a first step, 250 sample points were drawn from the ADM sampling frame.
This sample frame covers all populated areas of Germany and distinguishes ap-
proximately 53,000 geographical areas with 300-700 households each (Heckel &
Hofmann, 2014). The GIP made use of the stratification categories provided on
this sampling frame by selecting sample points such that the selection probabili-
ties of households were proportional to their occurrence in the population regard-
ing federal states, region and a classification of size and structure of municipalities
(BIK Strukturtyp, a classification of populated areas based on the properties of
population size and urbanity). 250 Primary Sampling Units (PSUs) were selected
representing 208 local administrative units.
In a second step, householdswere listedwithin thesePSUsby a separate random
route procedure. The listing was conducted prior to fieldwork and carried out by
interviewers not involved in the fieldwork in this specific PSU. Starting from a ran-
domly selected starting address, 100 households were listed with the address and
last name found on door bells and letter boxes. Note that in Germany, it is com-
mon to have the inhabitant’s last name displayed at an address: Less than 3 percent
of addresses had to be listed without a resident’s name. Many of these ”unnamed”
households are likely tobeuninhabited. All householdswere listed, nohouseholds
were skipped.1
In a third step, 22 addresses were drawn from the address list in each PSU: start-
ing from a random number between 1 and 5, each 5th address was selected to en-
sure sufficient physical distance between sample members. The first 16 addresses
drawn were defined as the first address batch, the other six addresses were kept as
a second reserve address batch. With this random division of the addresses into
two working samples it was easier for the the GIP team to steer the progress of
fieldwork and for the survey agency to manage the workload of their interviewers.
These two address batches are of special significance to the invitation incentive ex-
periment, as the experiment was only conducted with the addresses from the first
1 It is important to note that this listing of households without interval is unique in the German
fieldwork setting. Typically, surveys list and interview every 5th household only (e.g. German
Socio-Economic Panel). The listing without interval was chosen for quality control purposes,
because a) we assumed that interviewers would be less likely to skip unattractive households
and b) it is easier to cross-check an uninterrupted list.
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address batch. The final sample consisted of 5,500 listed households.
Once samplingwas completed the recruitment process began. In order to invite
respondents to the online panel, recruitment was carried out in two steps. First, a
face-to-face interviewwas conducted to list eligible individual samplemembers in
each household and to obtain consent from sample members to invite household
members to the online survey. Then, in a second step, consenting eligible sample
members were invited to the online panel.
4.2.2 Face-to-face recruitment
Face-to-face recruitment as well as sampling was contracted to TNS Sozial-
forschung. 135 interviewers were jointly trained by TNS and the GIP team to
conduct the interviews. About a week prior to interviewer contact, listed house-
holds received an advance letter. In cases where no family last name was listed,
letters were addressed to ”tenant’s of ”.
The letter briefly outlined the face-to-face survey withoutmentioning the panel
study. With the advance letter a project leaflet and a data protection statement
was sent. In all materials, only the face-to-face study was mentioned. We did not
specify that the purpose of the interview was recruiting panel members, nor that
the interview mode for the panel would be online. This approach was used to not
evoke selective nonresponse due to respondents being averse to a long-term com-
mitment.
As part of this letter, incentives were sent or announced. When sending the in-
vitation letters to the 4,000 respondents of the starting address batch, a controlled
random incentive experiment was conducted testing ae 10 promised cash incen-
tive against a e 5 unconditional cash incentive. For more details on this experi-
ment see chapter 5 in this dissertation.
The main purpose of the recruitment interview was to build a detailed house-
hold grid and assess the internet and computer equipment in the household. In
addition, some selected substantive questions were asked to show respondents,
what further survey waves may look like.
At the end of the interview, consent for a recontact was asked for all household
members aged16 to75 (born1937 to1996). Consenting samplemembersmoved
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on to the second recruitment stage, the online recruitment.
4.2.3 Offline households
Many online panels suffer from coverage bias, as persons without access to a com-
puter and the internet are not covered (Yeager et al., 2011). To overcome such
a coverage bias the GIP provides internet access and computers to such offline
households. In the face-to-face interview, interviewers recorded whether house-
holds were equipped with an internet connection and / or computers. If house-
holds lacked a computer, fast internet connection or both theGIP offered to set up
the equipment necessary to participate in the study. The inclusion of previous of-
fline households are an important feature to increase representativeness of theGIP
(Blom et al., 2017). Offline households are not part of the experiments discussed
in this dissertation, because their recruitment involved different steps, which may
not be affected by the incentives experiments.
4.2.4 Invitation to the online panel
Where consentwasobtained in the face-to-face recruitment, all age-eligible house-
holdmembers were sent a personally-addressed invitation letter to register for the
online panel.
The invitation letter contained information about the study, the URL of the
study page and login credentials. Using this information the invited household
members could register online for the GIP and thus became panel members. If
respondents did not register within two weeks, a reminder letter was sent. With
this first reminder letter, a second incentive experiment was conducted. A random
subset of respondents received ae 5 unconditional cash incentive. This incentive
experiment is discussed in chapter 6. In case respondents needed additional re-
minders, households were reminded via telephone and finally a second reminder
letter was sent when needed.
Once respondents registered with the panel, the GIP confirmed their email ad-
dress and invited respondents to a first online interview containing questions on
basic demographics, their internet usage, citizenship and place of birth. The first
wave of the online panel was fielded in September 2012, concluding the main re-
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cruitment process. Registration into the panel was open for latecomers until early
2013.
4.2.5 Online interviewing
Regular panel waves are fielded every other month. Panel management and ques-
tionnaire hosting and programming is conducted by the LINK Institute.2 Ques-
tionnaire content is delivered by researchers of the Collaborative Research Center
884. Those questionnaire proposals are compiled into a complete questionnaire
by the GIP team in consultation with the questionnaire design experts of GESIS -
Leibniz - Institute for the Social Sciences.
Oncequestionnaires are programmedand tested the recruited samplemembers
are invited to participate in a GIP online wave every other month. Field duration
is one calendar month. Reluctant respondents are reminded via email twice each
wave. In addition, during the final days of the field period, respondents are re-
minded via telephone.
When data collection is completed, the survey data are delivered to the GIP for
testing, documentation and anonymization. A Scientific Use File (SUF) of each
wave is published to the research community via the GESIS - Data Archive for the
Social Sciences six months after the fieldwork of that wave has finished.
2 After a merger the panel is now run by forsa marplan.
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5
Optimal use of incentives under a fixed
budget: The effect of conditional and
unconditional incentives on response
rates and sample composition
1
5.1 Introduction
In this chapter, I discuss survey budgets and incentives by focusing on a different
aspect: How do we best allocate money to offer incentives given a fixed budget?
1 This chapter uses data from the German Internet Panel. A study description can be found in
(Blom et al., 2015). TheGerman Internet Panel is funded by theGermanResearch Foundation
through the Collaborative Research Center 884 ”Political Economy of Reforms” (SFB 884).
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Is it better to promise money to the responsive part of the sample as a conditional
incentive or to give money to all sampled units in advance as an unconditional
incentive?
Previously, I discussed that incentives are best payed out in advance (see 3.5), in
cash (see 3.4) and that incentives of greater value increase the response rate more
(see 3.3). Given an unlimited budget, the recommendation would thus be to in-
centivize with a considerable unconditional cash incentive. In real life however,
budgets are limited and survey managers have to optimize results within their fi-
nancial restrictions.
In this situation, unconditional incentives’ inherent property of being paid out
to all sample members becomes a problem: It makes survey designs with uncon-
ditional incentivesmuchmore expensive than designs with conditional incentives
of the same value. This is especially true in a survey environment like Germany
with a (comparatively large) proportion of nonrespondents (Pforr et al., 2015).
Furthermore this leads to a trade-off between incentive amount and payment op-
tion: promising incentives to respondents leads to a reduced group of recipients,
allowing for larger incentive amounts. If the incentive budget has to be distributed
among a larger group of recipients, as is the casewith unconditional incentives, the
funds available per head will be lower.
The GIP recruitment incentive experiment addresses this trade-off and allows
one to answer the question of how to best allocate an incentive budget: promis-
ing an incentive, knowing that the conditional mode is sub-optimal, or paying an
unconditional incentive with a lower monetary value, knowing that incentives of
larger values perform better with respect to response rates.
This chapter will be structured as follows: first, I will provide an overview of
what previous studies have found regarding the use of conditional versus uncondi-
tional incentives. I will then describe the experimental design of the 2014 recruit-
ment incentive experiment and which data and methods will be used to analyze
potential bias resulting from different incentive modes.
I will subsequently present and discuss results of the recruitment process and
the experimental variation and its effects on sample composition of the resulting
sample in the GIP study.
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5.2 Conditional versus unconditional incentives:
Previous findings and research outline
Previous research has shown that response rates tend to be higher when sample
units receive unconditional incentives rather than conditional incentives (Singer,
Hoewyk, et al., 1999; Singer & Ye, 2013). This robust finding has been discussed
in section 3.5.
A prominent discussion of incentive effectiveness between conditional and un-
conditional incentives can be found in Scherpenzeel & Toepoel (2012). The au-
thors included cost calculations for the recruitment sample experiment in theLISS
online panel. For the personal interviews, an unconditionale 20 incentivewas the
most cost-efficient solution, as for this option the total cost for a registered house-
hold was the lowest. It remains an open question whether the different incentive
treatments influence not only the sample size, but also the sample composition.
When examining sample composition effects of incentives, other studies have
found no effect of unconditional incentives on nonresponse bias (Jäckle & Lynn,
2008) or bias-reducing effects, meaning those with lower response propensities
participate more when offered an incentive (Singer, Hoewyk, et al., 1999). Mixed
results are reported by Schröder et al. (2013): Whereas incentives increase the
participation of immigrants, a group typically underrepresented in surveys, it also
increases participation rates in rural areas, a demographic alreadywell represented.
In a summary of findings from nine German surveys, Pforr et al. (2015) state that
the results are inconclusive regarding nonresponse bias.
In the GIP incentive experiment, unconditional incentives were used in order
to achieve higher response rates. But as the use of unconditional cash incentives is
uncommon in survey research in Germany (Pforr et al., 2015), we conducted an
experiment to test for the presence of an effect of unconditional vs. conditional
incentives on response rates. In addition, we tested for the effect on sample com-
position.
There were many reasons for running this experiment. First and foremost,
the effect of unconditional incentives on response rates was tested in the spe-
cific context of the GIP. Secondly, the attitudes of respondents towards receiving
unconditional cash incentives was tested. As I will mention when discussing the
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SHAREsurvey in this dissertation (see chapter 7), therehadpreviously beenprob-
lems with unconditional cash incentives in Germany (Börsch-Supan, Krieger, &
Schröder, 2013). And finally, the experiment was designed to test the effect of the
unconditional incentives on the sample composition.
Even if unconditional cash incentives yielded higher response rates than con-
ditional incentives, this increase in participation might come at the expense of in-
creased bias in the sample. Unconditional incentivesmightmotivate a unique sub-
set of respondents more strongly than other groups.
To expand on this proposedmechanism let me give an illustrative example. Let
us assume that low income target households in the sample were highlymotivated
by an unconditional incentive. Further, we found that affluent target households
were not motivated by an unconditional incentive but rather by conditional in-
centives. If we now examined the resulting sample from this example, we would
find it biased towards low income households in the unconditional cash incentive
condition compared to the sample resulting from conditional incentive condition.
With this example I illustrate that higher response rates realized with an uncon-
ditional incentive do not necessarily result in a favorable outcome with respect to
sample composition. The resulting sample might be larger but more biased than a
sample realized with the more conservative approach of conditional incentives.
When deciding between unconditional and conditional incentives the issue of
sample composition influenced by the timing of the incentive payment needs to
be examined. If unconditional incentives lead to higher participation rates but this
group is of a select demographic, the effect may be an increased overall bias. If,
however, the additional respondents drawn to the survey by unconditional incen-
tives closely resemble those whowould also participate with an conditional incen-
tive, the resulting sample would be more balanced in addition to containing an
increased number of observations available for analysis and, in the case of theGer-
man Internet Panel, for subsequent panel participation. This chapter will provide
evidence on the effect of incentive mode on sample composition.
As mentioned earlier, there are many different ways of administering survey in-
centives. Due to this variety there is no one incentive effect on the sample compo-
sitionbut the effects dependonhow incentives are administered. Apotential effect
of incentives on the sample composition will not be universal but will depend on
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how exactly incentives are used.
When using unconditional incentives the issue of survey costs has to be con-
sidered, as implementing unconditional incentives is themore costly option com-
pared to conditional incentives of a given incentive value.
In the GIP we expected a 50 percent response rate at the recruitment interview.
TheGIP allocated the same part of the budget per respondent for conditional and
unconditional incentives. Thus, unconditional incentives had to be smaller. They
were discounted by the expected proportion of nonrespondents. As a result, the
incentive mode was expected to be cost neutral to the GIP budget.
Conditional and unconditional incentives are used in the GIP in the form of
a controlled experiment. This chapter will answer two questions: Do uncondi-
tional incentives have a larger effect on nonresponse than conditional incentives
and is there an effect on the sample composition when comparing unconditional
and conditional incentives while keeping the incentive costs equal across the two
incentives groups.
5.3 Data andmethods
I use data from the 2012German Internet Panel incentive experiment. The survey
is described in chapter 4.2, variables and analytical steps taken are described in this
section.
5.3.1 Design of the recruitment incentive experiment
In the GIP recruitment experiment the incentive budget was fixed, i.e. that condi-
tional and unconditional incentives were of identical cost per sample member. In
the caseof theGIP, a fixedbudget for incentiveswas calculated for ae 10promised
incentive to respondents. The response ratewas expected to be around 50 percent.
The budget therefore was e 10 times 50 percent of 5,500 sampled addresses, i.e.
e 27500.
At this fixed budget, offering a conditional incentive meant that the incentive
value had to be discounted by the proportion of samplemembers not participating
in the survey (i.e. by 50%). The prepaid incentive value thus had to be half of the
e 10 promised incentive. To test the effectiveness of a prepaid incentive versus a
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conditional incentive at a fixed budget, we thus decided to conduct an experiment
of ae 5 unconditional versus ae 10 conditional incentive.
Prior to the GIP fieldwork, the total sample was randomly split into a first and
second batch to be fielded at different times during fieldwork. This split was done
to better steer fieldwork processes and to be able to achieve the target sample size,
if response rates fell behind expectations. For the experiment, only the 4,000 ad-
dresses of the first batch were used. Exactly 100 cases had to be excluded from the
experiment as no family name was collected during household listing procedure.
The remaining 3,900 addresses are the base sample for the experiment.
Addresses were randomly selected into the conditional incentive control group
and the unconditional incentive treatment group. The experimental treatment
consisted of a variation in the incentive presentation and an advance letter adapted
accordingly. The advance letter announced an interviewer contact in the near fu-
ture, assured confidentiality and the voluntary nature of the survey. At the very
end of the letter the experimental variation was introduced. In the conditional in-
centive control group, the letter announced an incentive of e 10 handed out by
the interviewer as a thank you after the interview. Letters to sampled households
in the unconditional incentive group closedwith referring to an enclosede 5 bank
note as a thank you (see figures 9.0.1 and 9.0.2 in the Appendix). An overview of
the distribution of the random allocation of sampled households into experimen-
tal conditions is displayed in figure 5.3.1.
5.3.2 Methods
In this subsection, I lay out the analytical steps taken to investigate the effects of the
two incentive conditions. There are four steps in this process: describing the effect
of the experimental conditions on response rates, a manipulation check, a nonre-
sponse bias analysis by incentive conditions and a comparison of sample compo-
sitions between incentive groups. Steps one to three provide supporting evidence
and manipulation checks for the sample composition analysis.
The results section opens with a simple percent difference analysis in response
rates.
Next, I conduct amanipulation check for the randomization in the recruitment
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Figure 5.3.1: Overview of the 2012 GIP recruitment incentive experiment
experiment, because, while I ensured that the allocation to control and treatment
groups occurred randomly, even a random allocation may lead to an unequal dis-
tribution of key characteristics. Therefore, I compare data available for all sample
members, respondents and nonrespondents, according to their assignments to ex-
perimental conditions.
As a third step I include a nonresponse bias analysis. Whereas the experiment
is set up to be randomized over sample households, a selective nonresponse ef-
fect of the incentive condition could lead to differences in the composition of the
achieved sample. Nonresponse bias analysis is conducted by means of a fixed ef-
fects logistic regression (Allison, 2009;Bell& Jones, 2015)on surveyparticipation
with PSU as a group variable. This method controls for interviewer and regional
effects by keeping them constant. Interaction effects of individual characteristics
with the experimental incentive conditions are tested in the model to check for
selective nonresponse effects across experimental groups.
The main analysis answering the research question itself is a comparison of the
sample composition between recipients of unconditional and conditional incen-
tives. To examine the sample compositions, I use sample member characteristics
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from the survey and survey paradata but also using external data sources like com-
mercial and public area information. A detailed data description can be found in
the next subsection. Differences in means between the two experimental groups
are compared using a two-sample t-tests. As recommended by Gelman & Hill
(2007) I include no controls for post-treatment variables for the casual interpre-
tation of the main experimental effect. Following Brüderl & Ludwig (2015) no
controls for the group variable are added.
5.3.3 Data
The data I use in these analyses are from the recruitment interview and the inter-
viewer observation data of the 2012 GIP recruitment. These data are enriched
with area informationdata frompublic sources (Bundesinstitut fürBau-Stadt- und
Rauminformation, 2015) and a commercial data vendor (Microm, 2011).
5.3.3.1 Recruitment experiment
Recruitment interview data encompass all data directly derived from conduct-
ing the experiment. As described, 3,900 households were part of the experiment.
These households were randomly allocated to treatment groupswith 1,464 house-
holds in the unconditional and 2,436 households in the conditional incentive
group.
During fieldwork, about 12 percent of all households were discovered to be in-
eligible for the interview as they were not part of the GIP population, for exam-
ple because no private household was found at the specified address or all house-
hold members were outside the GIP age range. Excluding ineligible households
resulted in a sample of 1,311 households in the e 5 group and 2,147 households
in thee 10 condition (see figure 5.3.1).
5.3.3.2 Commercial area information
The GIP Data were enriched with data bought from Microm GmbH. These data
can be linked to street addresses in Germany. Microm data are collected from a
variety of data sources from federal agencies, as well as private enterprises. This
information is geocoded and processed. Microm data are provided at the level
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of a so-called ”Microzelle”, a group of about five houses (that can include multi-
ple households). Information linked to a street address is thus part of such a Mi-
crozelle, an aggregate of multiple households. The data are aimed at marketing
clients to gain insight on (prospective) customers. Microm data have been used
in the past to examine nonresponse patterns (e.g. Sinibaldi et al., 2014).
Commercial area information is used for the manipulation checks and sample
composition analyzes. I include information on economic prosperity of sample
points, an index of the purchasing power in a region (in thousand euros). An in-
dicator of persons with a university degree living at a given address is used as a
measure of education. Also I use dummy indicators marking adresses with a high
probability of single households, singles and foreigners. These indicatorsmust not
be confused with a real observations of these groups, it is rather a high likelihood
that, for example, single households are living at a given address.
5.3.3.3 Public area information
In order to assess regional effects on respondents’ response behavior, information
on the PSUs is used. I use statistics collected and aggregated by the federal sta-
tistical agencies. This information can be matched at the level of communities
(“Gemeinden”), the smallest level of political aggregation inGermany. Inmy anal-
ysis, I use an indicator for low, medium or high unemployment rates.
5.3.3.4 Interviewer observations
Another set of variables is the interviewer observations. Interviewers were re-
quired to record four observations at each sampledhousehold: whether thehouse-
hold had an intercom, the type of building the household lives in, themaintenance
status of the building and the perceived socioeconomic class of the household.
In a paper by Sinibaldi et al. (2014) the authors demonstrate the value of such
interviewer observations for nonresponse adjustment. These variables are there-
fore used as control variables for neighborhood and income related effects on sam-
ple composition. Having an intercom system is viewed as an additional burden for
contacting household members and might affect respondents cooperation nega-
tively. Only one interviewer observation per address is recorded at the first visit.
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Some interviewer observations were not recorded by the interviewer, about 12%
household information on intercom use, building type and building maintenance
and about 20% of class assessment by the interviewer are missing. Missing inter-
viewer observations are imputed using multiple imputation (with chained equa-
tions)(Rubin, 1987). Variables are summarized in table 5.3.1.
5.3.3.5 Recruitment survey data
The recruitment interview data is used in the final step of the analysis comparing
the resulting sample of the unconditional and conditional incentive groups. Re-
cruitment data is only available for those respondents who participated in the re-
cruitment interview (n=1,410).
A first set of variables is chosen to mirror data used in the manipulation checks.
The data used in the manipulation checks originate from outside data sources
and might be less precise than the answers of the respondents themselves. I use
self-reported health assessment recorded on a 5-point scale transformed into a
dummy indicator of very bad or bad health. The frequency of home internet us-
age is recorded into an indicator of the daily occurrence of such usage. Further
indicators of respondent characteristics include age (65 years or older coded as
one), gender, full-time employment, being a foreigner and having a college edu-
cation. Household information is captured with the indicators of household size,
a separate indicator for single households.
In addition, indicators of substantive interest to the GIP are included: These
are variables political interest and political attitudes. The variables chosen here
are respondents reporting high interest in political affairs and the results of a re-
call question of a respondent’s vote choice at the previous general election (Bun-
destag) held on September 27th 2009. I generated indicators for the five major
parties as well as non-participation in the election (”other”-category has been ex-
cluded).
An important characteristic of the GIP recruitment is the inclusion of so-called
offline households, i.e. households without high speed internet and/or computer
access. Therefore, I included an indicator for such households to see if the incen-
tive type is influencing the recruitment of offline households (Blom et al., 2017).
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Table 5.3.1: Summary statistics GIP recruitment incentive experiment,
recruitment paradata
mean min max
Recruitment experiment data
Participation in recruitment interview 0.45 0 1
Unconditional Incentive 0.38 0 1
Commercial area information
Purchasing power
Low 0.33 0 1
Medium 0.33 0 1
High 0.34 0 1
High probability of:
College graduates 0.22 0 1
Singles 0.17 0 1
Foreigners 0.21 0 1
Single households 0.16 0 1
Public area information
Unployment rate
Low 0.32 0 1
Medium 0.35 0 1
High 0.29 0 1
Interviewer observations
Intercom installed? 0.60 0 1
Building type
Farm 0.02 0 1
Familiy home 0.27 0 1
Semi detached house 0.16 0 1
3-4 apartments 0.13 0 1
5-8 apartments 0.23 0 1
9+ apartments, no high rise 0.18 0 1
High rise 0.03 0 1
Building maintenance
Good 0.19 0 1
Medium 0.74 0 1
Poor 0.06 0 1
Perceived class
Poor 0.03 0 1
Working 0.41 0 1
Middle 0.48 0 1
Upper middle 0.07 0 1
Upper 0.01 0 1
Observations 3,458
Note: GIP 2012 recruitment
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An overview of the recruitment survey data can be found in table 5.3.2.
Table 5.3.2: Summary statistics GIP recruitment incentive experiment,
recruitment interview variables , face-to-face respondents
mean min max
Bad health 0.12 0 1
Daily Internet use 0.15 0 1
High political interest 0.46 0 1
Bundestag election
Abstained 0.17 0 1
Voted CDU 0.20 0 1
Voted SPD 0.19 0 1
Voted FDP 0.06 0 1
Voted Greens 0.10 0 1
Voted Left 0.03 0 1
65 and older 0.24 1 1
Household size 2.33 1 8
Single household 0.26 0 1
Female respondent 0.39 0 1
Full-time employed 0.37 0 1
University degree 0.19 0 1
Foreigner 0.05 0 1
No Internet in household 0.13 0 1
Observations 1,410
Note: GIP 2012 recruitment, face-to-face recruitment inter-
view respondents only; standard deviation (household size)
= 1.19
5.4 Results
5.4.1 Main incentive effect
For the cases in the experimental condition, the message of the main effect is
clear and simple: unconditional incentives outperformed conditional incentives
in terms of the response rate realized. Thedifference between the two groups in re-
sponse rates is 8.4 percentage points (50.8% for the unconditional incentive group
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compared to 41.9% for the conditional incentive group; t=-5.1; RR1; (AAPOR,
2016)).
As the experiment was designed to be neutral in terms of the cost to the re-
searcher, meaning both conditions have the same upfront per unit cost, uncon-
ditional incentives are more cost-effective, because the resulting sample is larger
when unconditional incentives are used.
5.4.2 Manipulation check
The GIP incentive experiment is a randomized controlled experiment. House-
holds were randomly assigned to either the conditional or unconditional exper-
imental group. Due to the randomization and the large number of observations,
the gross sample should be evenly distributed across the two experimental condi-
tions. To make sure that the randomization resulted in an evenly distributed sam-
ple across experimental groups, I checked the distribution of key characteristics
available from the gross sample for the conditional and unconditional incentive
groups.
As a manipulation check, I perform a comparison of distribution means. The
results are shown in table 5.4.1. As expected, there are no significant differences
in means between the two experimental groups. This indicates that the sample is
evenly distributed across experimental groups with regards to interviewer obser-
vations, PSU characteristics and commercial paradata.
5.4.3 Nonresponse bias
To check for effects selected recruitment had on the treatment groups I conduct a
nonresponse bias analysis. The focus of this analysis is to detect if there are differ-
ent nonresponse effects of the conditional and unconditional incentive treatment
groups on participation in the survey, while controlling for frame variables and
survey paradata.
The nonresponse bias will be modeled using a fixed effects regression on re-
cruitment survey participation of the household informant. The group variable is
the PSU. By selecting this group variable the model controls for all PSU and inter-
viewer effects, that are constant across households in the sample as interviewers
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Table 5.4.1: Comparison of means between experimental groups, recruitment
paradata
Cond. incentive Uncond. incentive t-stat.
Commercial area information
Purchasing power
Low 0.33 0.33 −ƽ.ƿǆ
Medium 0.34 0.33 ƽ.ǃǄ
High 0.34 0.34 −ƽ.ǀƿ
High probability of:
College graduates 0.22 0.22 ƽ.ƽƽ
Singles 0.17 0.16 ƽ.ƽǅ
Foreigners 0.21 0.21 −ƽ.ǀǃ
Single households 0.16 0.17 −ƽ.ƿƿ
Public area information
Unemployment rate
Low 0.31 0.32 −ƽ.ǁǀ
Medium 0.35 0.34 ƽ.ǂƿ
High 0.29 0.29 ƽ.ƽǆ
Interviewer observations
Intercom installed? 0.61 0.59 ƽ.Ǆƿ
Building maintenance
Good 0.19 0.19 ƽ.ǀƽ
Medium 0.74 0.75 −ƽ.ǂƽ
Poor 0.07 0.06 ƽ.ǁƿ
Building type
Farm 0.01 0.02 −ƽ.ǆǀ
Familiy home 0.26 0.27 −ƽ.Ǆǆ
Semi-detached house 0.17 0.16 ƽ.ǂǅ
3-4 apartments 0.13 0.13 ƽ.ƽƿ
5-8 apartments 0.23 0.22 ƽ.ǃǅ
9+ apartments, no high rise 0.18 0.17 ƽ.ǀǅ
High rise 0.02 0.03 −ƾ.ƾƿ
Perceived class
Poor 0.03 0.04 −ƾ.ƾǁ
Working 0.41 0.41 −ƽ.ƾƽ
Middle 0.49 0.48 ƽ.ǅƽ
Upper middle 0.06 0.07 −ƽ.ǃǁ
Upper 0.01 0.01 ƽ.ƽǆ
Observations 2,147 1,311
∗ p < ƽ.ƽǂ, ∗∗ p < ƽ.ƽƾ, ∗∗∗ p < ƽ.ƽƽƾ
Note: t-stat.: two-sample t-test
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could work in multiple PSUs but only one interviewer was assigned to work in a
given PSU.
In the model, all commercial area information and interviewer observations
variables as seen in table 5.3.1 are introduced. Public area information variables
are constant within PSU and therefore not included in the model as main effects
but rather the effects are controlled for by the fixed effects regression model.
To detect whether nonresponse patters differ between experimental conditions
I include interaction effects with the unconditional incentive treatment for each
independent variable of the commercial area information and interviewer obser-
vations. In addition, I include the interaction effects with public area information
variables. In contrast to the main effect of public area information, the interaction
terms are not constant within PSUs and can be included in the model. If interac-
tion effects are significant in the model, I can conclude that the effect of a given
independent variable on participation differs between incentive conditions.
Figure 5.4.1 displays all interaction odds ratios and their confidence intervals.
One interaction odds ratio yields a significant result: The interaction betweenhigh
probability of single households and incentive condition. The odds of participat-
ing in the survey are about two times larger for the unconditional incentive treat-
ment group in PSUs with a high proportion of single households compared to the
conditional incentive group while controlling for other model effects. The other
interaction effects do not reach statistical significance.
The full nonresponse model can be found in the appendix in table 9.0.1. Here
it can be shown that threemain effects have significant effects on survey participa-
tion: living in a house in need of some (medium) maintenance, having an inter-
com installed and living in an area with higher purchasing power as measured by
marketing data all decreases the odds of participating in the survey compared to
relevant reference categories. These findings are not uncommon in nonresponse
research. In the context of this section they are not relevant to the research as the
effect of these independent variables is the same over both experimental condi-
tions.
Overall, one out of 21 tested interaction coefficients is significant, indicating
a different effect of the independent variable conditional on incentives: That of
PSUswith a highpercentageof single households in the incentive treatment group.
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Figure 5.4.1: Logistic fixed effects regression on survey participation, interac-
tion effects with incentive experiment, odds ratio coefficients and 95%KI
This finding has to be taken into considerationwhen interpreting sample composi-
tion effects of this variable, as selective participation by incentive treatment group
may confound the sample composition analysis. Summing up the evidence so far,
we can conclude that unconditional incentives lead to higher response rates than
conditional incentives and there is little evidence for nonresponse bias when using
unconditional incentives.
5.4.4 Comparison of distributions
As just presented, I find few indications that incentives influence the sample com-
position in the GIP via a selective participation propensity. Next I focus on the
realized sample. Does the incentive treatment deferentially affect the GIP sample
composition? That is, are there differences in key characteristics of sample mem-
bers that were recruited using unconditional incentives compared to conditional
incentives? To answer these questions I compare the distributions of variables in
the GIP online panel sample. As part of the incentive experiment, 1410 respon-
dents completed the first interview of the online panel and are the basis for this
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analysis.
First I compare theGIP online panel sample with respect to those variables that
I used in themanipulation check. Themanipulation check analyses have shownno
significant differences regarding the experimental conditions in the gross sample.
Now I perform the same comparison of means for the GIP online panel sample.
There are multiple ways to test for the significance of the mean difference. I chose
to use t-tests (Student, 1908).
The t-tests displayed in table 5.4.2 show no significant differences for the inter-
viewer observations, block level data, and sample point characteristics. Therefore
I can conclude that based on these variables the sample resulting from the face-to-
face recruitment interview does not differ in terms of the experimental conditions.
In addition to variables available for all sample members, variables from the in-
terview itself can be used for an analysis of the sample composition. I included
variables that are important indicators of the sample quality given the topic of the
survey, i.e. political reform making. The variables thus examined are self reported
health, daily internet use, political interest, voting behavior, age, gender, house-
hold composition andeducation. Results ofmean comparison t-tests are displayed
in table 5.4.3.
The results indicate no significant differences between the unconditional incen-
tive and the conditional incentive group. Themeans of household characteristics,
age, health, voting record, sex, citizenship and education are equal between the
two groups.
5.4.5 Discussion
This chapter presents results of the German Internet Panel recruitment experi-
ment. Unconditional cash incentives were tested against conditional cash incen-
tives. As incentive expenses per target household were held constant, conditional
incentives had double the value of unconditional incentives. I have shown that
unconditional incentives outperform conditional incentives in terms of response
rates. Unconditional incentives proved a more successful strategy to increase the
sample size than conditional incentives. Furthermore, when checking the sample
distribution, no differences between the two experimental groups could be de-
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Table 5.4.2: Comparison of means between experimental groups, recruitment
paradata, face-to-face respondents
Cond. incentive Uncond. incentive t-stat.
Commercial area information
Purchasing power
Low 0.26 0.28 −ƽ.Ǆƿ
Medium 0.38 0.36 ƽ.ǃǂ
High 0.37 0.36 ƽ.ƽǅ
High probability of:
College graduates 0.24 0.22 ƽ.Ǆǃ
Singles 0.15 0.17 −ƽ.ǆǃ
Foreigners 0.19 0.22 −ƾ.ƿƾ
Single households 0.15 0.19 −ƾ.ǂǀ
Public area information
Umployment rate
Low 0.38 0.35 ƾ.ǀǄ
Medium 0.33 0.35 −ƽ.Ǆǂ
High 0.25 0.26 −ƽ.ǃǃ
Interviewer observations
Intercom installed? 0.56 0.58 −ƽ.ǆƽ
Building type
Farm 0.02 0.01 ƽ.ǂǂ
Familiy home 0.29 0.31 −ƽ.ǂǄ
Semi detached house 0.17 0.18 −ƽ.ǀƿ
3-4 apartment 0.12 0.12 −ƽ.ƽǆ
5-8 apartment 0.20 0.21 −ƽ.ǀƽ
9+ apartment, no high rise 0.16 0.14 ƾ.ƽǄ
High rise 0.03 0.02 ƽ.ǂƾ
Building maintenance
Good 0.21 0.21 −ƽ.ƾƾ
Medium 0.74 0.75 −ƽ.ǃƽ
Poor 0.05 0.03 ƾ.ǁǆ
Perceived class
Poor 0.03 0.03 −ƽ.ǀǀ
Working 0.38 0.35 ƾ.ƽǅ
Middle 0.50 0.51 −ƽ.ǂǃ
Upper middle 0.08 0.10 −ƽ.ǅƾ
Upper 0.01 0.01 ƽ.ǁǂ
Observations 803 607
∗ p < ƽ.ƽǂ, ∗∗ p < ƽ.ƽƾ, ∗∗∗ p < ƽ.ƽƽƾ
Note: GIP 2012 recruitment, face-to-face recruitment interview respondents only; t-stat.:
two-sample t-test
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Table 5.4.3: Comparison of means between experimental groups, recruitment
interview variables , face-to-face respondents
Cond. incentive Uncond. incentive t-stat.
Bad health 0.11 0.13 −ƽ.Ǆǅ
Daily Internet use 0.15 0.15 −ƽ.ƽƾ
High political interest 0.48 0.43 ƾ.ǅǄ
Bundestag election
Abstained 0.17 0.17 −ƽ.ƽǅ
Voted CDU 0.21 0.18 ƾ.ǀǀ
Voted SPD 0.18 0.19 −ƽ.ƽǁ
Voted FDP 0.07 0.06 ƽ.ǁǃ
Voted Greens 0.10 0.09 ƽ.ǅǁ
Voted Left 0.03 0.03 −ƽ.ƽǄ
65 and over 0.23 0.25 −ƾ.ƾǀ
Household size 2.36 2.29 ƾ.ƽƿ
Single household 0.25 0.27 −ƾ.ƾǃ
Female respondent 0.40 0.38 ƽ.Ǆǅ
Full-time employed 0.37 0.36 ƽ.ǁǂ
University degree 0.18 0.20 −ƾ.ƽǀ
Foreigner 0.04 0.06 −ƾ.ƾƽ
No Internet in household 0.13 0.12 ƽ.Ǆǆ
Observations 803 607
∗ p < ƽ.ƽǂ, ∗∗ p < ƽ.ƽƾ, ∗∗∗ p < ƽ.ƽƽƾ
Note: GIP 2012 recruitment, face-to-face recruitment interview respondents only; t-stat.:
two-sample t-test
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tected. Incentive treatment thus is not a factor influencing the sample composi-
tion in the 2012 GIP recruitment survey. Only in the nonresponse analysis one
interaction coefficient showed an influence on response, conditional on incentive
treatment. This effect is arguably in a desired direction, as single households are
often an underrepresented demographic in survey samples. However, given the
number of effects tested this one significant effect may well be by chance. In addi-
tion, no effect was detectable when examining the sample composition of the GIP
online sample.
Given the findings of this experiment, the use of unconditional cash incentives
should be encouraged. Larger sample sizes are the result and I can detect no effect
on sample compositionof this incentive treatment compared to themore common
use of conditional incentives.
However, there are some caveats to the study. First, the results of the sample
comparisons are restricted to the variables available for both respondents andnon-
respondents.
Second, The experimental design is no full factorial design of incentive treat-
ments, thus it does not allowme to contrast paying incentives to not paying incen-
tives (see 3.1), to compare the effect of unconditional and conditional incentives
of the same size (see 3.5), or to investigate the optimal incentive value (see 3.3).
The goal of this experiment is a different one. The research question that can
be answered with this experiment is a rather practical one. Given a fixed budget,
how can the money be utilized for the maximum benefit of the survey: a prepaid
incentive to all sample members or a promised incentive upon completion to re-
spondents only? From the GIP recruitment incentive experiment, I can conclude
that given budget constraints, unconditional incentives are a more effective use of
available funds than conditional incentives.
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There is nothing quite as beautiful as cash!
Eric Idle,TheMoney Song
6
Using incentives in reminders to facilitate
recruitment
1
6.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter I discussed how to improve response rates in face-to-face
recruitment interviews for the German Internet Panel (GIP) using different types
of incentives under a fixed budget. In this chapter I examine the next recruitment
step, the invitation to the online panel. I describe the results of an experiment on
unconditional cash incentives when sending reminder letters to sample members
that did not already register with the study.
1 This chapter uses data from the German Internet Panel. A study description can be found in
Blom et al. (2015). TheGerman Internet Panel is funded by the German Research Foundation
through the Collaborative Research Center 884 ”Political Economy of Reforms” (SFB 884).
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High registration rates are crucial for the success of the GIP. Registration in the
GIP is defined as the mode switch from the face-to-face interview to participation
in the online panel.
6.1.1 Push toweb
In the literature encouraging respondents to switch to the online mode is re-
ferred to as push-to-web. This is a subset of research on mixed modes (Mavle-
tova & Couper, 2016). The main lines of research in this area are studies ex-
amining the effects of switches on either measurement error or mode effects
(e.g. Klausch et al., 2015) and studies examining the effects on response rates
(e.g. Millar & Dillman, 2011). As the GIP is not a mixed mode study and face-
to-face results are not compared to online results, measurement error and mode
effects are of less interest in this context. Instead, I concentrate on push-to-web
studies examining the effects on response rates. In some mixed mode studies the
results indicate that offering an additional choice of survey mode in a mail survey
decreases the overall response rate (Medway & Fulton, 2012). Cernat & Lynn
(2014), however, find no effect on overall response rates when offering a web
mode in addition to a CAPI mode. They were able to increase web pickup by
e-mail reminders and thus reduce fieldwork costs. Again contrary to both find-
ings, Millar & Dillman (2011) report an effective sequential mixedmode strategy
using mail advance letters, a token unconditional cash incentive and e-mail and a
finalmail followup reminder. This strategymaximized response rates compared to
single mode strategies. Recent reports suggest a sequential mixed mode strategy,
where respondents are first offered one (cheap) survey mode and are switched
only if they refuse to participate in this mode (Tourangeau, 2017).
6.1.2 Reminders in surveys
Recruiting sample members in person by interviewers is costly and time consum-
ing (see chapter 5). If these sample members cannot be convinced to join the
panel, this recruitment effort will not generate any return on investment. In ad-
dition, a high sign up rate reduces the potential for systematic bias due to non-sign
up (see 2.1).
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A standard measure in survey research are reminders (Dillman, 2011; Groves
et al., 2013). These can come in different modes (phone, mail, in person, e-mail).
Using reminders, cooperation can be increased, as hesitant respondents get an ad-
ditional chance to comply with the survey request.
Reminders can also be combined with incentives targeted towards nonpartic-
ipating sample members. In the GIP, such a procedure was tested: A reminder
letter was mailed to encourage sample members to go online and register with
the GIP. With this reminder letter, a e 5 unconditional cash incentive was tested
against no incentive.
Including incentives when reminding nonparticipants is a form of targeting in-
centives towards a specific sub-population of the sample. This is a rather uncom-
mon procedure in surveys, where usually all sampled persons receive an incentive.
(see 3.6).
I discussed targeted incentives in chapter 3.6. Therefore, I will just briefly recap
the most important aspects of the method in the research literature.
The ethical aspect of targeted incentives, for example the unfairness in reward-
ing uncooperative response, is often discussed in literature. However, research
finds that respondents do not perceive such measures as unfair (Singer, Groves,
& Corning, 1999). Most studies report the use of targeted incentives to aid re-
fusal conversion (seeAbreu&Winters, 1999;Cyffkaet al., 2012; Juster&Suzman,
1995; Kay et al., 2001). As with other forms of incentives, there is little evidence
of an influence on sample composition, although Juster & Suzman (1995) report
a more balanced sample with the incentive intervention.
A comprehensive study on the effects of reminder incentives not just on re-
sponse rates but also on data quality and sample composition is reported by
McGonagle & Freedman (2017). The authors report on a controlled experiment
using targeted incentives on the 2013 fieldwork of the Panel Study of Income
Dynamics (PSID). Nonrespondents were randomly allocated into a $5 or $10
unconditional cash incentive treatment group in addition to a no incentive con-
trol group. Response rates increased significantly in the cash incentive conditions
without there being a difference between the $5 and $10 groups. Looking at
different demographic subgroups, cash incentives were found to have a larger
effect on increasing response rates for older respondents. There was no effect
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of the treatments on item nonresponse, a finding the authors interpret as there
being no effect on data quality. Comparing the sample composition of the tar-
get sample with the realized sample in treatment and control groups, the study
concludes that the reminder incentive “brought in a disproportionate number
of less-educated respondents, who were less likely to have responded before
the…mailing” (McGonagle & Freedman, 2017, p. 16).
From these findings I derive the first two research questions for this chapter.
First, I examine the effect of reminder incentives on panel participation: Can an
unconditional cash incentive, included in a reminder letter increase the response
rate in the GIP? Expanding on the research of effects of incentives, I examine
whether including an unconditional cash incentive influences the composition of
the realized sample.
In addition to examining the effects of incentives on sample composition and
response rates, incentive cost are examined in this chapter. Spending part of the
budged on incentives has direct costs. But howdo those costs compare to the total
survey costs? What is the overall balance of incentives, are the direct costs outbal-
anced by savings in other areas of the survey? The data from the GIP provides
some evidence on the question as to whether including a reminder incentive is
cost efficient or not.
The chapter is structured as follows: The reminder experiment sample and data
used are described in section 6.2. Then results regarding the effect on response
rates and on the sample composition are presented, followed by an overview of in-
centive cost in theGIP reminder experiment. The chapter closes with a discussion
of the results.
6.2 Data andmethods
6.2.1 Sample
The recruitment incentive experiment was conducted during the 2012GIP online
recruitment. The full recruitment procedures are described in section 4.2, espe-
cially subsection 4.2.4. TwoGIP sample subgroups are not available for the exper-
iment due to diverging fieldwork procedures: sample members interviewed using
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the short face-to-face doorstep interview and those without computer and or In-
ternet access classified as offliners. All other GIP sample members that failed to
registerwithin twoweeks of their initial invitationwere part of the reminder exper-
iment sample. Figure 6.2.1 gives an overviewof the online recruitment procedures
after completion of face-to-face interviewing.
Short Interviews (422)
1603 panel members /  998 hh
Full Interviews (2121) 
with internet
Panel invitation 
2632 p. / 1325 hh
Reminder letter 1 
1709 p. / 932 hh
Reminder letter 2
Reminder call
Panel invitation 
487 p. / 264 hh
Panel invitation 
422 p. /  hh
without internet
5€
1077 p. / 565 hh
0€
613 p. / 375 hh
Figure 6.2.1: Push-to-web process, GIP 2012
The vehicle for the experiment was a reminder letter mailed out to individual
sample members who had not registered with the GIP, within two weeks. This re-
minder letter was the first communication in the reminder process, thus we call it
the first reminder letter. In total, 1,709 persons were eligible for the first reminder
letter. However, 19 sample members had to be excluded from the experiment for
survey practical reasons. This leaves 1,900 sample members that received this re-
minder letter and are part of the experiment. The reminder letter contained the
full information on how to register for the GIP including login credentials and the
URL of the GIP website.
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6.2.2 experimental design
About two-thirds of these samplemembers were randomly selected into the treat-
ment group. To avoid confounding the results with respondents learning about
different incentive treatments from other members of the same household we
stratified the random selection by households and made sure all household mem-
bers received the same treatment. 1,077 persons were selected into the treatment
group, receiving reminder letters containing ae 5 note to thank respondents ”for
their efforts”. 613 respondents were selected into the control group. The con-
trol group received a reminder letter that just reminded them to register without
containing an incentive.
Two weeks after the mailing of the first reminder letter, respondents were eli-
gible for additional reminders by telephone or mail in case they failed to register.
Therefore, I am differentiating between sample members registering up until two
weeks after they received the first reminder letter and those that registered after
this time span. The pure effect of the reminder can only be examined in the first
group as those respondents did not receive additional reminders. In contrast, sam-
ple members that registered at a later date could have received additional commu-
nication to remind them to register.
6.2.3 Data
Data available for analyzing the sample composition are from the same data
sources as described in chapter 5. I select variables available for all sample mem-
bers that might potentially correlate with the participation decision based on
the literature presented in subsection 2.2.4. A purchasing power indicator and the
proportion of personswith a university degree in the area are available fromblock-
level commercial area information. From public records of the INKAR database
(Bundesinstitut für Bau- Stadt- und Rauminformation, 2015) I use an indicator
for low, medium or high unemployment rate at the level of municipalities. A third
set of information is interviewer observations collected by interviewers when con-
ducting the face-to-face recruitment interview. From this interviewer observation
data, information on building type and building maintenance is used. From the
recruitment interview itself data on household size are used. Summary statistics
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on these data are presented in table 6.2.1.
6.2.4 Methods
To answer the research questions, I first present recruitment rates for both experi-
mental conditions. I check for registration within two weeks to exclude effects of
other reminders. In addition, I examine whether there is an effect of the recruit-
ment incentive for respondents that registered later than this two week period.
To asses cost efficiency, I will use information on data collection cost and reg-
istration rates.
6.3 Results
6.3.1 Main effect
Including a e 5 unconditional cash incentive in the reminder letter increased
the recruitment rate substantively and significantly. Results are displayed in ta-
ble 6.3.1.
In thefirst row, registrationswithin thefirst twoweeks are tabulatedby reminder
incentive experiment condition. Among those sample members, the percentage
difference in registrations is 17.3 percentage points in favor of the unconditional
cash incentive treatment (control: 17.8%vs. treatment 35.1%;%d=17.3; t=-7.71).
This contrast is highly significant.
In addition to this pure effect of the first reminder letter there also are spill over
effects on those respondents that registered later than two weeks after the mailing
of that letter. These registrations are tabulated in the second row on the results
table 6.3.1 by experimental condition. Among those sample members we still ob-
serve an effect of increased registrationnumbers. Theeffect isweaker than thepure
effect within two weeks, but still significant (control: 11.9% vs. treatment 14.5%
; %d=2.6; t=-3.46). Therefore, even though these sample members received ad-
ditional reminders by mail and telephone I still observe a significant effect of the
unconditional cash incentive.
Figure 6.3.1 illustrates the relative frequency of registered samplemembers over
time.
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Table 6.2.1: Summary statistics, recruitment paradata
mean min max
Household size 2.94 1 8
Commercial area information
Purchasing power
Low 0.26 0 1
Medium 0.38 0 1
High 0.36 0 1
Public area information
High Probability of:
College graduates 0.21 0 1
Unemployment rate
Low 0.37 0 1
Medium 0.34 0 1
High 0.25 0 1
Interviewer observations
Building type
Farm 0.01 0 1
Familiy home 0.31 0 1
Semi detached house 0.19 0 1
3-4 apartment 0.14 0 1
5-8 apartment 0.18 0 1
9+ apartment, no high rise 0.14 0 1
High rise 0.02 0 1
Building maintenance
Good 0.21 0 1
Medium 0.75 0 1
Poor 0.04 0 1
Observations 1,690
∗ p < ƽ.ƽǂ, ∗∗ p < ƽ.ƽƾ, ∗∗∗ p < ƽ.ƽƽƾ
Note: standard deviation (household size) = 1.29
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Table 6.3.1: Registration rate to the GIP online panel over time by reminder
incentive experiment condition
Control Incentive Total %d t-stat.
Registered within 2 weeks ƾƽǆ ǀǄǅ ǁǅǄ
% ƾǄ.ǅ ǀǂ.ƾ ƿǅ.ǅ ƾǄ.ǀ −Ǆ.Ǆƾ
Registered later Ǆǀ ƾǂǃ ƿƿǆ
% ƾƾ.ǆ ƾǁ.ǂ ƾǀ.ǂ ƿ.ǃ −ǀ.ǁǃ
Did not register ǁǀƿ ǂǁƿ ǆǄǁ
% Ǆƽ.ǁ ǂƽ.ǁ ǂǄ.ǃ
Total ǃƾǁ ƾ, ƽǄǃ ƾ, ǃǆƽ
Note: Reminder letter 1 recipients that registeredwithin twoweeks of reminder letter
reception only; t-stat.: two-sample t-test
On the x-axis I plot days since samplemembers received the reminder letter. On
the y-axis I graph the cumulative frequency of registered sample members. The
curves show the cumulative percentages of registered respondents of all eligible
sample members by days elapsed since receiving the first reminder letter. Three
curves are plotted: A curve for the unconditional cash incentive group, one for the
control group, and a curve for all sample members.
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Figure 6.3.1: Sample members registered over time in percent
We see that the short dashed line depicting the registration rate of the uncondi-
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tional cash incentive group has a steeper incline than the dashed line of the control
group. The figure indicates that the reminder letter including the unconditional
cash incentive is not only more efficient overall but also leads to sample members
registering comparatively more quickly.
6.3.2 Sample composition
As the unconditional cash incentive greatly improves the registration rates and
speed, I also examine whether these increased registration rates come at the cost
of a bias in the sample composition. Themechanism for this bias could be that the
incentive encourages different groups in the sample to participate selectively. This
argument has already been outlined in section 5.2.
To compare the sample composition between the incentive and no incentive
groups, I conduct t-tests for mean differences between incentives and control for
each control variable. This analysis is restricted to those 487 respondents who reg-
istered in the time span between receiving the reminder letter and two weeks after
receiving the letter, as here I can observe the pure effect of the reminder incentive
experiment. Results of these tests are displayed in table 6.3.2.
The results show that there are no significant differences in the composition of
the two samples with regards to the variables available. None of the t-tests indicate
significant differences.
I conclude that using ae 5 cash incentive with the reminder letter does not in-
troduce notable differential bias in the composition of the resulting GIP sample.
There is a caveat however. These results are restricted to the variables available for
analyzing the sample composition, which are limited to information available to
both respondents and nonrespondents.
6.3.3 Response rates over time
As in all panel studies participation in the GIP decreases over time due to panel
attrition. The reasons for this dropout are loss of contact to panelists, illness or
death, a move abroad or just an unwillingness to participate further in the GIP. A
figure of the number of participants in theGIP across the first 12waves is displayed
in figure 6.3.2.
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Table 6.3.2: Sample composition at registration within two weeks by re-
minder incentive experiment groups, comparison of means, recruitment para-
data
e 0 e 5 t-stat.
Recruitment survey data
Household size ƿ.ǅǀ ƿ.Ǆǁ ƽ.ǃǃ
Commercial area information
Purchasing power
Low ƽ.ƿƿ ƽ.ƿǅ −ƾ.ƾǂ
Medium ƽ.ǁƾ ƽ.ǀƿ ƾ.ǅǃ
High ƽ.ǀǄ ƽ.ǁƾ −ƽ.Ǆǃ
High probability of:
College graduates ƽ.ƿǀ ƽ.ƿƾ ƽ.ǂƾ
Public area information
Unemployment rate
Low ƽ.ǀƾ ƽ.ǁƽ −ƾ.ǃƾ
Medium ƽ.ǀǀ ƽ.ǀǀ ƽ.ƽǁ
High ƽ.ǀƾ ƽ.ƿǁ ƾ.ǁǁ
Interviewer observations
Building type
Farm ƽ.ƽƽ ƽ.ƽƿ −ƾ.ǀƿ
Familiy home ƽ.ǀǂ ƽ.ǀǃ −ƽ.ƿƾ
Semi detached house ƽ.ƿƾ ƽ.ƿƿ −ƽ.ǀƾ
3-4 apartment ƽ.ƾƽ ƽ.ƾǀ −ƽ.ǅǄ
5-8 apartment ƽ.ƾǃ ƽ.ƾǁ ƽ.ǁƾ
9+ apartment, no high rise ƽ.ƾǁ ƽ.ƾƾ ƽ.ǆƿ
High rise ƽ.ƽǂ ƽ.ƽƿ ƾ.ǁƾ
Building maintenance
Good ƽ.ƿǂ ƽ.ǀƽ −ƾ.ƾǁ
Medium ƽ.Ǆƽ ƽ.ǃǄ ƽ.ǃƽ
Poor ƽ.ƽǃ ƽ.ƽǀ ƾ.ǀƽ
Observations 109 378
∗ p < ƽ.ƽǂ, ∗∗ p < ƽ.ƽƾ, ∗∗∗ p < ƽ.ƽƽƾ
Note: Reminder letter 1 recipients only; t-stat.: two-sample t-test
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All GIP respondents are graphed using the solid line. 1,603 sample members
registered for the GIP online panel and were invited to the first wave. The partic-
ipation pattern is typical for panel studies: there is a larger drop in participation
fromwave one (1,483 respondents) to wave two (1,171 respondents) and a stable
development thereafter. I added a line of all GIP panelists to serve as a reference
to the participation pattern of the panelists in the experiment.
Comparing the overall participation numbers with those in the reminder ex-
periment and registering within two weeks after receiving the first reminder letter
(n=487 dash-dotted line) the pattern is very similar, with the initial drop being
flatter than in the overall curve.
The short dashed line depicts the development in participation for those receiv-
ing a reminder incentive, the long dashed line the cases from the control group.
There are no differences between the development of the treatment and the con-
trol group. All recruited panelists across the experimental groups behave similarly
over time. In a next step I look at sample composition over time.
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Figure 6.3.2: Participation in GIP over waves including reminder incentive
experiment
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6.3.4 Sample composition over time
The GIP is a panel study; respondents are repeatedly approached with survey re-
quests. I therefore re-analyze the effects of reminder incentives after two years of
panel surveys. Again, I compare those respondents that received an unconditional
cash incentive with the first reminder letter to those respondents that did not re-
ceive this incentive.
Due to panel attrition, the number of observable cases are reduced to 135: Re-
spondents in wave 12 of the GIP who registered within two weeks after receiving
a first reminder letter. Again, I compare means between experimental groups and
run a t-test. Results can be found in table 6.3.3.
The results are mixed. The comparison of means test yield two significant dif-
ferences in building type variables: The proportion of respondents living in family
homes is larger in the control group whereas the proportion of respondents living
in semi detached houses is larger in the treatment group. Other contrasts in the
building type variables and other variables are not significant.
I find 2 of 19 test of differences between experimental conditions to be signif-
icant. Overall, I do not find a consistent bias of using unconditional cash incen-
tives. The evidence is not compelling enough to confirm long term effects of the
reminder incentive on long term sample composition. The resultmay hint at some
effects, but additional research is necessary on the true nature of long term sample
composition effects of reminder incentives.
6.3.5 Costs
I have now established that introducing an unconditional cash incentive in the re-
minder mailing significantly increases registration rates without inducing notable
bias in the sample composition. Thus, including an unconditional cash incentive
has a scientific value in terms of a larger sample size. But is the measure cost-
efficient as well?
It is evident that including unconditional cash incentives in the reminder letters
is a considerable direct cost added to the budget. These direct costsmight be offset
by savings in other domains. I will now examine two possible cost saving mech-
anisms and their role in the GIP recruitment: cost savings by reduced reminder
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Table 6.3.3: Sample composition at GIP wave 12 by reminder incentive ex-
periment groups, Comparison of means, recruitment paradata
e 0 e 5 t-stat.
Recruitment survey data
Household size ǀ.ƽǀ ƿ.ǃǂ ƾ.ǃƽ
Commercial area information
Purchasing power
Low ƽ.ƿǀ ƽ.ƿǄ −ƽ.ǁǅ
Medium ƽ.ǀǄ ƽ.ǀǁ ƽ.ǀǀ
High ƽ.ǁƽ ƽ.ǀǆ ƽ.ƾƽ
High probability of:
College graduates ƽ.ƿǆ ƽ.ƿǁ ƽ.ǂƽ
Public area information
Unemployment rate
Low ƽ.ǀǁ ƽ.ǁǄ −ƾ.ǀƽ
Medium ƽ.ƿǆ ƽ.ƿǄ ƽ.ƾǅ
High ƽ.ǀƾ ƽ.ƿǀ ƽ.ǆǅ
Interviewer observations
Building type
Farm ƽ.ƽƽ ƽ.ƽǁ −ƾ.ƿƽ
Familiy home ƽ.ǂǁ ƽ.ǀƿ ƿ.ǀǄ∗
Semi detached house ƽ.ƽǆ ƽ.ƿǆ −ƿ.ǁǅ∗
3-4 apartment ƽ.ƽǆ ƽ.ƾƽ −ƽ.ƿǁ
5-8 apartment ƽ.ƾǄ ƽ.ƾƽ ƾ.ƾƿ
9+ apartment, no high rise ƽ.ƾƾ ƽ.ƾǀ −ƽ.ƿǁ
High rise ƽ.ƽƽ ƽ.ƽƿ −ƽ.ǅǁ
Building maintenance
Good ƽ.ǀǁ ƽ.ǀǄ ƽ.ƿǆ
Medium ƽ.ǃǀ ƽ.ǃƽ ƽ.ǀƽ
Poor ƽ.ƽǀ ƽ.ƽǀ −ƽ.ƽǁ
Observations 35 100
∗ p < ƽ.ƽǂ, ∗∗ p < ƽ.ƽƾ, ∗∗∗ p < ƽ.ƽƽƾ
Note: stat.: two-sample t-test
efforts during recruitment and savings by reducing total recruitment costs.
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6.3.5.1 Reduced reminder effort
When speaking about total reminder effort I examine reminder cost in addition to
the first reminder letter. Whenever the first reminder was effective by encouraging
a sample member to register, no further reminders had to be fielded for this par-
ticular sample member. In contrast, those sample members that do not register
timely after receiving the first reminder will be eligible for a telephone reminder
and eventually a second reminder letter (see figure 6.2.1). This makes recruiting
those cases more expensive.
By increasing registration rates as a result of the first reminder letter, uncondi-
tional cash incentives may be cost efficient by saving additional reminder effort.
The average cost of additional reminders (telephone reminder, second reminder
letter) ise 8.67 per piece for all 1,203 sample cases that did not register within two
weeks. In this cost I include all variable costs of the reminder process like printing,
shipping and handling of letters, and the telephone reminder. I did not include
staff costs as these costs are more or less fixed.
When splitting those costs by incentive treatment and control group, I can see
that, on average, reminder efforts for the treatment group amount to e 7.20 per
case (698 cases) and e 10.70 for the control group (505 cases) (see table 6.3.4).
As incentives aree 5.00 per piece, bringing the total cost per case in the treatment
group toe 12.2, I can conclude that incentives were not cost efficient on reducing
reminder effort when solely considering those cost elements.
Table 6.3.4: Costs of additional reminders after first reminder letter by re-
minder incentive experiment group
Control Incentive Total
Number of cases ǂƽǂ ǃǆǅ ƾ, ƿƽǀ
Costs of additional reminders ine ǂ, ǁƽǁ ǂ, ƽƿǃ ƾƽ, ǁǀƽ
Average cost of add. reminders per case ine ƾƽ.Ǆ Ǆ.ƿ ǅ.Ǆ
Incentive cost per case ine ƽ ǂ ƿ.ǆ
Total cost per case ine ƾƽ.Ǆ ƾƿ.ƿ ƾƾ.ǃ
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6.3.5.2 Total recruitment cost
In addition, I examinewhether the reminder incentive is cost effective by reducing
the overall recruitment cost.
To illustrate the effect of the reminder letter incentive I compare the realized
sample and a scenario, where the 2012GIPwould have been recruitedwithout the
reminder letter incentives in terms of online panel registration success and field-
work cost. Results are displayed in table 6.3.5.
Table 6.3.5: Comparison of total recruitment cost with and without incentive
treatment
Scenario: GIPƿƽƾƿ
no exp.
Reminder letters sent ƾ, ǃǆƽ ƾ, ǃǆƽ
Registration rate for reminded cases ƿǆ.ǃ ǁƿ.ǁ
Registered panellists from reminded cases ǂƽƽ Ǆƾǃ
Overall registered panellists ƾ, ǀǅǄ ƾ, ǃƽǀ
Total fieldwork cost 2012 GIP recruitment ine ǂǁǃ, ƽǂƿ ǂǂƾ, ǁǀƿ
Fieldwork cost per recruited panelist ine ǀǆǁ ǀǁǁ
Note: ”Scenario: no exp.”: scenario 2012 GIP recruitment without reminder letter
incentive experiment; ”GIP 2012”: data fromGIP 2012 recruitment
In the third column I display the results from the GIP 2012 recruitment as it
was conducted. 1,690 reminder letters were sent in the experiment. From these
cases 42.4 percent or 716 persons registered in the GIP online panel. Those 716
cases are part of the 1,603 panellists who registered during the whole GIP 2012
recruitment. The total recruitment cost for the 2012 survey weree 551,432. If we
set those costs in relationship to the 1,603 panellists the per case recruitment costs
aree 344.
For the scenario without the reminder incentive experiment I assume the re-
minder registration rate was that of the control group in the experiment of 29.6
percent for all cases (see table 6.3.1). All other effects in the scenario are kept as
in the real 2012 recruitment. This is a realistic assumption as the reminder incen-
tive experimentwas a randomized controlled experiment and all other factorswere
kept constant. The numbers for the scenario derived from this assumption are dis-
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played in column 2. 1,690 reminder letters without any incentive would have re-
sulted in 500 registered cases, 216 less than in the actual 2012 GIP recruitment.
The total number of registered panellists in the scenario is thus 1,387 216 cases
less than in the real 2012 recruitment. Total fieldwork costs in the scenario are
e 546,052, reduced by the direct cost of reminder letter incentives(e 5,380) com-
pared to the realGIP 2012 recruitment cost (the cost for increased reminder effort
can be neglected). Fieldwork cost by recruited panellist in the scenariowithout re-
minder incentive experiment aree 394, ae 50 increase compared to the real per
case cost in the 2012 GIP recruitment.
If we now want to replace those 216 cases we need to increase the sample size,
conductmore face-to-face interviews, invitemore respondents to theGIP.The to-
tal cost of recruiting 216 additional GIP panel members ate 394 a piece is about
e 85,000. This is the sum required to recruit the same sample size without incen-
tives than what has been achieved with the reminder incentive experiment.
Comparing the e 5,380 investment in unconditional cash incentives with the
huge savings of e 85,000 I can conclude that for every Euro spent on incentives
there is a return of savings of about e 15.8. The unconditional cash incentive is
cost effective in reducing the total recruitment cost.
6.4 Discussion
In this chapter I have shown that includingunconditional cash incentives of amod-
est amount in the reminder process greatly increases the registration rate in the
GIP. Including ae 5 note in the reminder letter significantly increases registration
rates in theGIP online panel. In addition, the sign up process is quicker than in the
control group. Including an unconditional cash incentive does not influence sam-
ple composition of the resulting GIP online sample. Panel retention rates are not
affected by the incentive treatment. Cost analysis show that including ae 5 cash
incentive is cost efficient as the small incentive investment brings a large return in
recruited panellists.
These findings are in linewith findings of a positive effect of reminder incentives
on participation rates as reported byMcGonagle & Freedman (2017). In contrast
to the study by McGonagle & Freedman (2017) I do not find the incentives to
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influence sample composition when comparing subgroup effects.
The discussion of cost effectiveness is an important contribution to the litera-
ture. Building on work by Scherpenzeel & Toepoel (2012) I show that thee 5 in-
centive treatment is cost effective by reducing the number of face-to-face recruited
samplemembers that do not sign up for the online panel. This is to a certain extent
due to the design of the 2012 GIP recruitment, where a large part of the fieldwork
cost, the face-to-face interview, are fixed. The situation in other studies might be
different and needs to be examined closely. However, I am confident that the find-
ing of cost effectiveness of unconditional reminder cash incentives can be trans-
ferred to other situations.
In summary, I highly recommend the use of unconditional cash incentives in re-
minder processes. For these reasons, in the GIP 2014 refreshment sample recruit-
ment, the e 5 unconditional cash incentives scheme was adopted for all sample
members with the login letter.
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Some people say it’s folly, but I’d rather have the lolly.
Eric Idle,TheMoney Song
7
TheSHAREGermany wave 4 incentive
experiment
7.1 Introduction and background
1
Thestudy reported in this chapter concerns an incentive experiment conducted
in the 2011German refreshment sample Survey of Heath, Ageing and Retirement
1 This paper uses data from SHARE Wave 4 (DOI: 10.6103/SHARE.w4.600,), see B(Börsch-
Supan, Brandt, et al., 2013) for methodological details.
The SHARE data collection has been primarily funded by the European Commission
through FP5 (QLK6-CT-2001-00360), FP6 (SHARE-I3: RII-CT-2006-062193, COM-
PARE: CIT5-CT-2005-028857, SHARELIFE: CIT4-CT-2006-028812) and FP7 (SHARE-
PREP: N°211909, SHARE-LEAP: N°227822, SHARE M4: N°261982). Additional fund-
ing from the German Ministry of Education and Research, the Max Planck Society
for the Advancement of Science, the U.S. National Institute on Aging (U01_AG09740-
13S2, P01_AG005842, P01_AG08291, P30_AG12815, R21_AG025169, Y1AG455301,
IAG_BSR0611, OGHA_04-064, HHSN271201300071C) and from various national funding
sources is gratefully acknowledged (see www.share-project.org).
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in Europe (SHARE, see chapter 4.2). The SHARE incentive study fits this dis-
sertation nicely, as it examines the effect of offering no incentives versus uncondi-
tional cash incentives. In addition, the optimal amount of incentives is assessed.
Testing unconditional cash incentives ofe 40,e 20 ande 10 meant using incen-
tives of high value for the German survey contex. The incentive experiment was
part of a research project examining ways to increase response rates in face-to-face
surveys by means of respondent incentives and interviewer training. In addition,
a nonresponse follow-up study was conducted to measure nonresponse bias (see
Börsch-Supan, Krieger, & Schröder, 2013). In this chapter, I will report only on
the respondent incentive part of the experiment. The interviewer training part of
the project had tobe cancelleddue tofieldwork issues and thenonresponse follow-
up is beyond the scope of this dissertation. An earlier version of these results have
been published inBörsch-Supan, Krieger,&Schröder (2013) andhave beenmod-
ified to fit this dissertation 2.
7.2 The use of large cash incentive sums in Europe
I have reported in chapter 2.2 that the research on the right amount of incentives
is mixed. While some studies find that larger incentive values increase response
rates, others find little to no effect. A unique feature of the SHARE incentive ex-
periment is testing different values of large unconditional cash incentives in a face-
to-face study in Europe. To date there have been only two other studies that ex-
perimentedwith similar amounts of unconditional cash incentives in Europe: The
2 I gratefully acknowledge funding for the project ”Respondent incentives, Interviewer Training
and Survey Participation” by the German Research Foundation (DFG) through the ”Priority
Programme Survey Methodology 1292” (Coordinator: Uwe Engel). Principle Investigators of
the Project wereAxel Börsch-Supan andMatthis Fräßdorf (Schröder). Researchers working on
this project were Annelies Blom andUlrich Krieger. I am thankful for the help provided by our
student research assistantsUteHoffstätter, AnnaKrüger, Elisa Leonhard, andMaximilianWeiß.
At the Institut für angewandte Sozialforschung (infas) Anne Kersting and Birgit Jesske were
working on the project and I thank them for their valuable input and oversight of the fieldwork
implementation. I thankFraukeKreuter, JosefBrüderl, ArieKapteyn,MickCouper, PeterLynn,
PeterLugtig, JulieKorbmacher, andStephanieEckman forhelpful comments. Parts of thiswork
have been presented at the Allbus Methodenworkshop 2011, the International Panel Survey
MethodsWorkshop 2012, the RC 33 research conference, and the International Conference of
the DFG Priority Programme 1292 on SurveyMethodology.
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LISS panel in the Netherlands (Scherpenzeel & Toepoel, 2012) and PIAACGer-
many field test (Martin et al., 2014). In the LISS panel incentive amounts ofe 10,
e 20 and e 50 were tested during the recruitment of the LISS probability-based
online panel. Using e 20 and e 10 resulted in quite similar recruitment rates of
40.3% and 39.9% respectively. Using a e 50 cash incentive however, resulted in
a lower recruitment rate of 37.3%. Overall, Scherpenzeel & Toepoel (2012) con-
cluded that thee 10 was the most efficient incentive amount.
In contrast, following a field test PIAAC concluded that a e 50 unconditional
cash incentive was the most cost-efficient resulting in a response rate of 41.7%.
Response rates increasedmonotonously with increasing values of the offered cash
incentive (Martin et al., 2014).
7.3 Data andmethods
7.3.1 Sample
The SHARE recruitment incentive experiment was conducted during the 2011
SHARE Germany Wave 4 refreshment sample interviews. Fieldwork procedures
are described in section 4.1.
7.3.2 Experimental design of the incentive experiment
When the project was started in September 2010, the threefold design of the ex-
periments was finalized in cooperation with the team running the SHARE survey
at theMEA and the agency contracted for fielding the survey, the Institut für ange-
wandte Sozialforschung, Bonn (infas).
The first part of the study evaluates whether prepaid cash incentives increase
cooperation rates and how these rates are influenced by different amounts of cash
incentives. The implementation of this experiment is no trivial matter, as uncon-
ditional prepaid cash incentives are not commonly used to increase response rates
in Germany. In contrast to the original plan of running the incentive experiment
double blind (i.e. neither interviewers nor respondents would know about the ex-
periment), we decided to run the experiment half blind, informing interviewers
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about the treatment condition of respondents, while leaving the respondents un-
informed.
The reasons for this decision were twofold. First, the agency had doubts about
the practical implications of not informing the interviewers about such a consid-
erable design feature. They deemed it important for the interviewers to be fully
informed about all aspects of the survey to present the study correctly and posi-
tively when establishing contact. If respondents with questions about the incen-
tives they receivedmet an interviewer who was completely unaware of this partic-
ular study feature, it may have reflected badly on the interviewer, the agency, the
survey sponsor, and the study as a whole.
Second, informing interviewers about the incentives creates amore realistic sce-
nario. When using incentives in subsequent surveys (without experimental con-
trol), interviewers are well aware of the presence of incentives. They can refer to
the incentives and use them as a reference when making contact. So in a real set-
ting, incentives will always jointly affect interviewers and respondents. Running
the experiment blindly on the respondents’ side only thus increases the generaliz-
ability of our findings to future survey research projects.
The entire refreshment sample was divided into four different batches to be
fielded sequentially. The batches were sized so that the target size of 4,000 cases
would be realized if a response rate of 55 percent (5,247 addresses), 45 percent
(1,050 additional addresses) or 40 percent (840 additional addresses) could be
realized during fieldwork. 2,098 addresses were kept as an additional reserve. To
allow samplemembers in the treatment group asmuch time as possible in the field,
the experimentwas run in the first batch of addresses that were sent out right at the
beginning of the field time.
Individuals from PSUs in communities with fewer than 9,000 inhabitants were
excluded from the experiment, because there was a considerable risk of respon-
dents finding out about other respondents’ incentives and thus of confounding
the treatment conditions in these smaller towns and villages. Out of the total of
210 PSUs that the refreshment sample was drawn from, 54 PSUs were excluded
for this reason.
After the addresses had been drawn from the registry, the survey agency deliv-
ered the sample to SHAREand the project team. Experimental conditions and the
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control group were randomly allocated in all of the 156 larger PSUs in the survey.
Therefore, all PSUs in the experiment contained sample members of the three ex-
perimental conditions and the control group. As a consequence, the experiment
was run in all German regions and all interviewers had sample cases in all experi-
mental conditions, as interviewers usually work in a certain PSU. Table 7.3.1 gives
a summary of the experimental setup, where the size of the treatment groups was
chosen according to considerations of statistical power for the significance tests.
Table 7.3.1: Summary of sample sizes
PSUs Sample persons
Full sample 210 9,235
First batch 210 5,247
Excluded (small communities) 54 1,347
Part of the experiment 156 3,900
Experimental conditions
e 40 prepaid 156 750
e 20 prepaid 156 750
e 10 prepaid 156 1,375
No prepaid incentive 156 1,025
7.3.3 Fieldwork issues - reduced sample size
Prior to proceeding to the results section, twodevelopments during fieldworkhave
to be mentioned: problems during fieldwork and reactions of respondents to in-
centives.
Unfortunately, the survey operations conducted by infas did not proceed as
planned. Due to high interviewer workloads across infas studies, too few inter-
viewers worked actively on the SHARE survey. This led to massive delays in both
the wave 4 refreshment sample and the SHAREGermany panel cases.
Confrontedwith the delays in fieldwork and continued capacity problems at the
agency, the SHARE coordination decided to halt the refreshment sample field-
work and concentrate on the panel cases. Nonetheless, fieldwork progress kept
slow, panel cases took about 15months to be completed. The refreshment sample
fieldwork could not be resumed after having been halted.
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This leads to the unfortunate situation that not all sample cases have been
worked on completely and, thus, the incentive experiment is confounded.
7.3.4 Respondents’ reaction to incentives
In addition to these issues related to the infas fieldwork capacity, there was an-
other unforeseendevelopment in thefield. Fromthe start of fieldwork in early June
2011, when the first advance letters reached the sampled households, the survey
agency registered an unusually high volume of calls to the hotline. During the first
week of fieldwork, a total of 85 calls were received. In a memo sent to the SHARE
team, infas reported about calls of anxious respondents, who were unhappy with
the cash provided in their advance letter.
Most of the people calling the hotline questioned the legitimacy of the survey,
some even felt pressured into the survey –quite the opposite of the intended effect.
Note, however, that the overwhelmingmajority of the respondents (almost 94per-
cent), didnot voice concerns. In response to the complaints, thehotline staff spoke
to respondents and also to police, lawyers, the Arbeitskreis deutscher Markt- und
Meinungsforschungsinstitute (the business association representing the private-
sector market and social research agencies), and representatives of municipalities
that received complaints by sample members. One complaint to a member of the
German Bundestag reached high levels at the Federal Ministry of Education and
Research, the sponsors of SHARE in Germany.
Although the infas staff could reassure most callers of the sincere motives of
the project, at the time infas informed the project team at SHARE, already 3,065
advance letters of the 5,421 respondents from the first batch had been mailed to
the households, of which 1,723 contained a cash incentive. As a result of the infas
memo, the advance letter was changed, putting evenmore emphasis on the volun-
tary nature of the survey and the unconditional gift character of the incentive.
In addition, a second advance letter was mailed to the 3,065 sample members
who had already received the original version of the advance letter. There was lit-
tle indication that this new letter helped to reduce skepticism among potential re-
spondents, as hotline calls remained frequent during the mailing of the remainder
of the advance letters and only dimmed off five weeks into the field period, when
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all letters had reached sample members.
In summary, fieldwork was particularly difficult for SHARE wave 4 in Ger-
many. Whereas the reactions to incentives turned out to be a smaller issue (see
table 7.4.4) the reduction in sample size as a result of the halted fieldwork of the
refreshment sample dampens the analytical potential of the incentive experiment.
However, as shown in the following section, there are sill interesting lessons to be
learned from the experiment.
7.3.5 Data
Data for this analysis has three sources: register data from the sampling frame,
paradata from conducting the interviews and SHAREGermany wave 4 data.
7.3.5.1 Register data
The SHARE wave 4 refreshment sample was drawn from register data. Thus as a
byproduct of sampling I have a set of information available on all samplemembers.
More specifically, the register information on gender and being born 1957-1960
are available for all sample members. The information on younger age cohorts is
used to generate the dummy variable “50-54 years old”.
For sampling, the population figures of communities the PSUs were located in
where used. (Lynn et al., 2013). Those population figures were used in the analy-
sis. Communitieswith a population size smaller than35,000 inhabitants are coded
into the dummy variable “smaller sample points”, communities with more than
200,000 inhabitants are coded into the dummy variable “larger sample points”.
7.3.5.2 SHAREwave 4 paradata
From SHARE wave 4 interview paradata I use data to identify experimental
groups. In addition, a dummy variable indicating the second version of advance
letters with changed wording was used for the analysis.
Furthermore, the survey agency infas recorded hotline refusals andmade them
available for analysis. Contact is coded using SHARE samplemanagement system
data. All eligible cases that were contacted are coded 1 whereas all eligible non-
contacts are coded 0. Cooperation is coded using SHARE sample management
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system data outcome codes. All full interviews are coded as 1, all eligible sample
members or those of unknown eligibility not providing an interview are coded as
0.
7.3.5.3 SHAREwave 4 data
For sample composition analysis I use variables from the SHAREGermanyWave
4 interview. From interview data I select variables that are of general interest to
SHARE.
As a measure of poor health I constructed two dummy variables from self re-
ported mediocre and poor health (PH003). Based on the question about the cur-
rent occupation (EP005) I coded dummy variables for currently being in a job
or self employment and for being in retirement. Number of children is directly
taken from the SHARE question CH001. Information on respondents education
is taken from variable DN010 on the highest school leaving certificate and Dum-
mies for“Abitur” and “Hauptschulabschluss” are created. The question about the
degrees of higher education or vocational training (DN012) was used to code the
dummy variables for mentioning vocational training and university education.
Respondents saying theypraydaily ormultiple times aday (EX029)were coded
1 creating the dummy variable “praying often”. Self placement on the left-right po-
litical ideology continuum is taken from the SHARE variable EX028. As proxy for
cognitive ability I used results from a math problem SHARE respondents had to
solve (CF108-CF112). Those who solved the problem are coded 1 into the vari-
able “cognitive ability” and others are coded 0. Respondentswhohad taken part in
at least one of the social activities presented in SHAREquestionAC035 (e.g. char-
ity work or community-related organization) were coded 1 in the variable “social
activities” and 0 otherwise.
7.4 Results
Due to the fieldwork problems, the analysis of incentive effects is restricted to ad-
dresses that either have a final disposition code (ineligible, refusal or interview)
or could not be contacted during the field period while exhausting the minimum
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number of eight personal visits to the housing address. These selected addresses
have been worked on properly according to the field protocols.
7.4.1 Bivariate effect of incentive treatment on cooperation rates
Out of the 3,900 addresses originally in the experiment 2,241 households meet
this condition. Cooperation with the survey request is measured at the house-
hold level. While SHARE is a survey of individuals and incentives were targeted
to the persons drawn from the register, the survey also targets cohabiting house-
hold members. As the incentive may also have an influence on these partners of
the sampled person, we look at cooperation of at least one householdmember. Ta-
ble 7.4.1 shows the results of the three treatment conditions and the control group.
Table 7.4.1: Effect of incentives on cooperation
Control e 10 e 20 e 40
(N) (%) (N) (%) (N) (%) (N) (%)
Not cooperating 398 72.6 494 61.7 258 59.2 209 45.8
Cooperating 150 27.4 307 38.3 178 40.8 247 54.2
Total 548 100 801 100 436 100 456 100
The proportion of sample members cooperating with the survey request in-
creases monotonously with the value of the incentives. The control group has
the lowest cooperation propensity of the four groups (27.4%). Payinge 10 cash
unconditionally to sample members yields a cooperation rate of 38.3% and thus
increases the likelihood of taking part in the survey by 10.9 percentage points
compared to the control group that received no incentive upfront (38.3% versus
27.4%). The e 20 incentive group has a larger cooperation rate, the percentage
difference to the control group is 13.4 (40.8% versus 27.4%). The cooperation
rate of the e 40 group is the highest, 26.8 percentage points higher than that of
the control group (54.2% versus 27.4%). All differences to the control group are
statistically significant indicating that paying larger incentive amounts increases
the participation to a larger extent than the smaller cash amounts.
Comparing between incentive groups, the difference between e 10 and e 20
unconditional cash incentive is not statistically significant (38.3% versus 40.8%,
86
Chapter 7: The SHARE Germany wave 4 incentive experiment
%d=2.5). I observe a significant percentage point difference of over 15.9 between
thee 20 and thee 40 incentive treatments (54.% versus 38.3%). This contradicts
the work by Scherpenzeel & Toepoel (2012) who found a diminishing return of
large incentive offerings in the LISS panel. Our findings are in line with a meta
study conducted by Singer, Hoewyk, et al. (1999) that found a significant, mono-
tonic effect for incentive sizes.
7.4.2 Multivariate analysis of incentive treatment on cooperation
rate
To check whether these findings hold inmultivariate analysis, a fixed-effects logis-
tic regressiononhousehold cooperationwas conducted. As households are nested
in interviewers, we use interviewer fixed-effects. Explanatory variables are limited
to frame variables available for all respondents and nonrespondents. In this regres-
sion gender, age group, having received the second version of the advance letter
(see section 7.3.4), and the incentive treatment are controlled for. Population size
of the municipalities of the sampling points is controlled by adding dummy vari-
ables for the lower third (9,000-35,0000 inhabitants) and the upper third of the
population distribution (more than 200,000 inhabitants) respectively. Table 7.4.2
shows the results.
Table 7.4.2: Fixed-effects logistic regression on household cooperation
odds ratio coefficients standard error
e 10 incentive 1.91∗∗∗ 0.27
e 20 incentive 2.18∗∗∗ 0.38
e 40 incentive 4.07∗∗∗ 0.72
Male target person 1.25∗ 0.14
50-54 years old 1.10 0.14
2nd Version of advance letter 0.89 0.20
Smaller sample point 0.49∗ 0.15
Large sample point 0.93 0.25
∗ p < ƽ.ƽǂ, ∗∗ p < ƽ.ƽƾ, ∗∗∗ p < ƽ.ƽƽƾ
N: 2,751; McFadden’s R2: 0.05; 107 interviewers
In addition to the effects of the incentive treatment, two control variables yield
significant results: gender and living in smallermunicipalities. Households ofmale
87
Chapter 7: The SHARE Germany wave 4 incentive experiment
target persons have 25 percent higher odds of cooperation than if the target person
is female. The odds for cooperation of households in communities with less than
35,000 inhabitants are reduced by about 50 percent compared to households from
towns that have between 35,000 and 200,000 inhabitants.
Regarding the main effect, we show the contrasts of the control group to the
treatment groups. All those effects are positive and significant, meaning that the
odds of responding are larger for all incentive groups other than the control group.
For the e 10 and e 20, the odds are about twice as large as in the control group,
for thee 40 group the odds of responding are four times as large as in the control
group.
The positive effect of incentives on response propensity can thus also be shown
in multivariate analysis. But given that fieldwork had to be terminated early, one
possible explanation for these positive effects could be selective interviewer ef-
forts.
7.4.3 Effect of incentives on contact attempts
Interviewers might choose a strategy where cases in the incentive condition are
preferred by Interviewers or worked on harder by Interviewers. Such a strategy
would potentially influence the survey outcome.
Given that interviewers are aware of the incentive treatments and they are pri-
marily paid per completed case, interviewers have strong incentives to focus their
efforts on those cases that have been offered an incentive due to the anticipated
higher chances of a successful interview.
I therefore analyze the effect of the incentive treatment on the contact propen-
sity of households. If interviewers prioritized contacting incentivized households,
we would expect to find effects of incentives in this analysis. As above, we use gen-
der, age, the advance letter version, and PSU population size dummies as control
variables. Individual differences in interviewers’ effectiveness are again controlled
for by using interviewer fixed effects. Table 7.4.3 below shows the results of the
fixed-effects logit regression on contact.
For this analysis all 3,900 cases from the experiment are included in the analysis,
however, 778 addresses from29 interviewers have to be dropped from the analysis
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due to lack of variation on the dependent variable. These interviewers eithermade
contact with all addresses or no addresses at all.
Table 7.4.3: Fixed-effects logistic regression on household contact
odds ratio coefficients standard error
e 10 incentive 1.05 0.18
e 20 incentive 0.96 0.18
e 40 incentive 1.01 0.20
Male target person 0.87 0.10
50-54 years old 0.58∗∗∗ 0.07
2nd Version of advance letter 1.16 0.27
Smaller sample point 0.62 0.25
Large sample point 1.70 0.72
∗ p < ƽ.ƽǂ, ∗∗ p < ƽ.ƽƾ, ∗∗∗ p < ƽ.ƽƽƾ
N: 2,824; McFadden’s R2: 0.02; 88 interviewers
The only significant effect in this analysis is the negative coefficient of being
in the age cohort from 50 to 54 years. The odds of those sample persons being
contacted are 38 percent smaller than those of the older sample persons. There
is no significant effect of the incentive treatment groups, indicating that the con-
tact propensity does not depend on whether a prepaid incentive has been sent or
not. Hence we find no evidence that the interviewers used the information on the
incentive treatment to make their contact decision.
This is plausible since we know from talking to the agency and the interviewers
that driving distances between households is their foremost consideration when
planning their work. While interviewers get some compensation for travel cost,
theirmain income stems fromfinalized interviews. Thus, they try to optimize driv-
ing distances between addresses. Given that incentivized addresses are distributed
randomly, incentives did not affect the contact strategies of interviewers.
7.4.4 Incentives leading to refusals
Asmentioned in section7.3.4, the unconditional incentive treatment alsohadneg-
ative consequences, since an unusually high number of sample persons were wor-
ried about the sincerity of the project and called the study hotline. Some of those
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calls resulted in sample members refusing their participation right away. In those
cases, no interviewer can be sent out to try to achieve their participation.
197 respondents out of 3,900 targeted sample members in the SHARE wave 4
refreshment experiment refused via the hotline, accounting for about 50 percent
of the total call volume to the hotline. The distribution with regard to treatment
groups is shown in Table 7.4.4.
Table 7.4.4: Hotline refusal by treatment groups
Control e 10 e 20 e 40 Total
Number of refusals 16 86 45 50 197
Number of sampled households 1,050 1,350 750 750 3,900
% of hotline refusals per sampled hh 1.5 6.4 6.0 6.7 5.1
Note: hh: households
Table 7.4.4 clearly shows that refusals via hotline occurred more frequently
among the treatment groups. The proportion of sample members refusing is
about equal across treatment groups at about 6.5 percent and the differences is
not statistically significant. Refusal in the control group is considerably lower at
1.5 percent of the sample members.
This result may be interpreted as an indication that the increased resentment
towards the survey in this group is due to the sending of cash as such, not due to
the amount of cash. The loss of sample members to hotline refusals has to be put
into the perspective of the large gains in cooperation in the treatment conditions.
Moreover, while one has to take the hotline refusals seriously, the great majority
(almost 95percentof samplemembers)didnot voice concerns about the incentive
treatment and cooperated in greater numbers with survey request than those not
in the control group.
The lesson learned here is that unconditional cash incentives tend to comewith
a larger number of respondents voicing their concerns. A survey operation needs
to be aware of this fact and have adequate response procedures in place to reassure
respondents, the public, funders, and other stakeholders of the legitimacy of the
survey and the use of incentives. As a direct consequence a report on incentive use
inGermany has been commissioned showing the practice and success of incentive
use in Germany (Pforr et al., 2015).
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7.4.5 Cost efficiency of incentives
I have shown that using cash incentives comes with the benefit of an increased re-
sponse rate and thus additional cases for analysis. But besides this scientific bene-
fit, are incentives also cost efficient when fielding a face-to-face survey?
I analyze the cost structure by applying the cost calculations as has been sug-
gested by Scherpenzeel & Toepoel (2012) when they analyze the cost effective-
ness of a LISS panel experiment.
Using the cooperation rates for experimental conditions in the SHARE incen-
tive experiment I determine the gross sample size needed to obtain a final sample
of 500 panel participants. 500 participants is an arbitrary sample size used tomake
results comparable between groups and to the results obtained in Scherpenzeel
& Toepoel (2012). I then determine the cost of such a sample by calculating the
fieldwork cost and adding the incentive cost. Results of the cost calculations for
the SHARE incentive experiment are displayed in table 7.4.5.
Table 7.4.5: Costs per cooperating household (hh) to obtain a final sample
size of 500 households, calculated for different incentive conditions
Incentive Cooperation
ratea (%)
Gross
sample
size b
(hh)
Total
fieldwork
costc
(e)
Total
incentive
cost (e)
Total costs
per hhd
(e)
No incentive 27.4 ƾ, ǅƿǂ 94,900 ƽ 190
e 10 38.3 ƾ, ǀƽǂ 67,860 ƾǀ, ƽǂƽ 162
e 20 40.8 ƾ, ƿƿǂ 63,700 ƿǁ, ǂƽƽ 176
e 40 54.2 ǆƿǀ 47,996 ǀǃ, ǆƿƽ 170
a Rates from table 7.4.1
b 500 registered households/(predicted registration rate / 100)
c Fieldwork cost are on averagee 52 per case
d (Total fieldwork cost + total incentive cost)/500 registered households
Using the observed cooperation rates from table 7.4.1 the required sample sizes
to obtain 500 households in the final sample are calculated. Higher response rates
require smaller gross samples. For the control group a sample size of 1,825 is
needed to obtain 500 panel respondents given the cooperation rate of 27.4 per-
cent, while in the e 40 group a sample of 923 cases is sufficient to reach the goal
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of 500 respondents (cooperation rate: 54.2%). Total costs are then calculated us-
ing thee 52 per case fieldwork cost of the SHARE wave 4 Germany refreshment
sample. For the control group, the costs are 1,825 cases x e 52 + e 0 incentive
cost=e 94900. For thee 40 condition the total costs are calculated as 923 cases x
e 52 +36,920 incentive cost(e 40 x 923 cases)=e 84,916. The last column of ta-
ble 7.4.5 displays the total cost per household (total cost divided by 500) for each
experimental condition.
The table shows that the total cost per household is highest in the no incentive
condition (e 190) and lowest in the e 10 incentive condition (e 162). Each of
the incentive conditions results in lower total costs per household than the no in-
centive condition (e 20 condition: e 176, e 40 condition: e 170). Offering an
incentive is always more efficient than no incentive. The substantial direct cost of
cash incentives are offset by the recruitment success when using incentives.
While the SHARE and the LISS survey have very few design characteristics in
common, these findings are in line with the findings reported by Scherpenzeel &
Toepoel (2012, table 4), who also found a e 10 cash incentive to be most cost
effective with a per household cost ofe 150 when using CAPI interviews without
prior phone contact to respondents.
In contrast to my results, in the LISS experiment the highe 50 incentive con-
dition comparedmore unfavorably to thee 10 condition with a cost ofe 268 per
household. In contrast in the SHARE results the high e 40 is almost as efficient
as the e 10 condition. This is due to the high response rates in the e 40 condi-
tion which leads to a total household cost that is much lower (e 170). The high
incentive condition in the SHARE survey poses a more efficient alternative than
the high incentive condition in the LISS experiment. I doubt that thee 10 differ-
ence in the incentive amount is the driving factor of this finding. There might be
a different, unknown underlying explanation to this difference, possibly the effect
is nonlinear but there is a threshold between “low” and “high” incentives.
This analysis shows that using prepaid cash incentives does not only increase re-
sponse rates but can also be cost efficient by reducing the gross sample size needed
and thereby reducing the total field work cost.
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7.4.6 Sample composition
To check for effects of the different incentive treatments on sample composition
I compare the sample persons characteristics in the achieved net sample. The net
sample resulting from the gross sample used for the incentive experiment yielded
882 cases (see 7.4.1). Because of sample size restrictions, I group all incentive con-
ditions together and compare them to the control group. For comparison I use ba-
sic demographic variables, variables indicating community involvement, and vari-
ables of interest to SHARE like retirement, cognitive ability, income, and health.
Results are displayed in table 7.4.6.
Table 7.4.6: Comparison of means between groups (standard deviations in
parentheses)
Incentive No Incentive
mean sd mean sd
Male .49 (.50) .49 (.50)
Age 50-54 .17 (.38) .24 (.43)
Health: fair .30 (.46) .24 (.43)
Health: bad .13 (.33) .12 (.33)
Working .31 (.46) .36 (.48)
Number of children 1.86 (1.35) 1.89 (1.39)
Low school education .49 (.50) .45 (.50)
(Hauptschule)
High school .17 (.37) .18 (.39)
(Abitur)
Vocational training .54 (.50) .58 (.49)
University education .21 (.41) .28 (.45)
Voluntary work .20 (.40) .19 (.39)
Social activities .40 (.49) .41 (.49)
Left right scale 4.96 (1.90) 4.88 (2.05)
Praying often .25 (.43) .22 (.41)
Cognitive ability .73 (.44) .73 (.44)
Retired .51 (.50) .43 (.50)
hh income 4,737 (7,635) 5,028 (7,088)
Observations 732 150
Note: sd = standard deviation
When comparing SHARE respondents with and without incentives, three
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mean comparisons are significant. The proportion of younger sample members
(50 to 54 years) is significantly larger than among those respondents 55 and older
(t=1.90, two-sample t-test). From frame data we know the true value in the gross
sample for this age cohort is 18 percent. The incentivized sample is thus closer
to the true value. In addition, two mean differences are significant. In the treat-
ment groups, the proportion of retired respondents is 8 percentage points larger
(t=-1.79, two-sample t-test) and the proportion of respondents reporting a uni-
versity education is 7 percentage points lower (t=1.95, two-sample t-test) than
in the control group. Other mean differences do not reach the level of statistical
significance.
I provide some evidence for an effect of incentives on sample composition. For
the youngest age cohort we have some evidence that incentives help to achieve a
more balanced sample. For the effects incentives showwhen comparing university
education and being retired we can not tell if incentives bring the findings in the
realized sample closer to the true value or not as no frame data is available.
7.5 Summary
This chapter provides an overview of an experimental study implemented in the
German sub-sample of SHARE. From the results we can draw five conclusions.
First, prepaid cash incentives are effective in increasing response rates. Second,
larger cash incentive values lead to higher response rates. Response rates are
monotonously increasing with an increase in cash incentive value. Third, prepaid
cash incentives are cost effective as they reduce the gross sample size to be con-
tacted during fieldwork by increasing cooperation rates. The e 10 condition is
the most cost efficient. Fourth, there is little evidence for influences of the incen-
tive treatments on sample composition. Comparing samples across experimental
groups, I observe more similarities than differences. Fifth, prepaid incentives (re-
gardless of the amount) lead to higher initial refusals even before the interviewer
attempts contact with the household. These refusals are outweighed by the gains
in response rate.
Comparing our finding with prior studies with large incentives in Europe we
find the SHARE results are similar to the results from the PIAAC Germany field
94
Chapter 7: The SHARE Germany wave 4 incentive experiment
test (Martin et al., 2014) where response rates increased monotonously with in-
centive value. In contrast to the SHAREfindings PIAAC found thee 50 incentive
condition the most cost effective. In the SHARE experiment as in the LISS panel
(Scherpenzeel & Toepoel, 2012), the e 10 condition is the most cost effective.
However, in contrast to the SHARE findings, the LISS panel experiment found
that the largest incentive condition of e 50 had lower recruitment rates than the
e 10 ande 20 incentive conditions.
Comparing the three experiments in PIAAC, the LISS - Panel and SHARE, all
studies generally find unconditional cash incentives to improve sample members
cooperation. Their results differ when the results for different experimental con-
ditions of different incentive values are compared.
There is a huge caveat with this analysis, as the fieldwork was aborted before
completion. Therefore, I can´t tell if and how continued fieldwork would have af-
fected the results. Maybe the cases coming in late in fieldwork would have been
harder to reach and thus reduced overall response rates. If this would be the case
the effect of large cash incentives reported in this study would be too high (com-
pared to the response rates in the PIAAC incentive experiment by Martin et al.
(2014)). However, I can also argue that thewave 4 SHAREGermany refreshment
samplewith its severe fieldwork problems is a very rigorous test for an incentive in-
tervention. The true incentive effect, given regular fieldwork, might be even larger.
Despite the caveat the SHARE study and the literature show how powerful large
unconditional cash incentives are to improve survey participation.
As an outlook I see two further worthwhile avenues of research in the topic of
large cash incentives, especially in Germany. One would be to further investigate
the cost effectiveness of large cash incentives. In studies designed and conducted
in cooperation with fieldwork companies the relationship between survey cost,
fieldwork effort and respondent incentives could be examined inmore detail. This
would allow to better allocate survey budgets to incentives, fieldworkmanagement
or interviewers tomaintain or even improve survey quality given budget restraints.
A second research question would be that of long-term effects of large cash in-
centive offerings. The economic literature on motivation crowding out effects of
pro-social behavior (Frey & Jegen, 2001) describes the effect of people becoming
unwilling to continue with a pro-social behavior once they get a financial reward
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for it. If the crowding out effect can be applied to survey participation, offering
incentives would, in the long run, have a negative effect on survey participation.
While there is evidence for crowding out effects in other areas the effect on survey
participation has not been tested.
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Conclusion
In this thesis I presented three experiments using unconditional cash incentives.
In this concluding chapter I will recapitulate the findings and their implications for
survey research in Germany.
In the first experiment, the GIP recruitment incentive experiment (chapter 5),
the use ofe 5 unconditional versuse 10 conditional incentives is tested. The in-
centive value is chosen to be cost neutral to the research budget as unconditional
incentives are paid out to twice asmany samplemembers as the conditional incen-
tives given a response rate of about 50%.
The results show that unconditional cash incentives have a larger effect on re-
sponse rateswithout introducing a bias into the resulting sample. Given these find-
ings and that using unconditional cash incentives was cost neutral, unconditional
incentives are clearly to be preferred to conditional incentives based on the results
of this experiment.
The second experiment, the GIP reminder incentive experiment(chapter 6) is
about testing the addition of ae 5 unconditional cash incentive to a reminder let-
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ter against a control group without incentive treatment.
The results show that adding the incentive increases the registration rate, does
not alter sample composition at registration, has a weak effect on sample compo-
sition after 12 panel waves, and is cost-efficient by reducing total recruitment cost.
Basedon the results of the reminder incentive experiment the use of unconditional
reminder incentives is highly recommended.
The third experiment, the SHARE Germany wave four recruitment incentive
experiment(chapter 7) tests the use of unconditional cash incentives of e 10,
e 20, ore 40 against a no incentive control group. Results show a monotonously
increasing response rate with increasing incentive value. There is litte evidence
for sample composition influence of the incentive treatment. e 10 unconditional
cash incentives is the most cost-efficient incentive treatment, closely followed by
thee 40 treatment.
Table 8.0.1 shows an overview of the results of all experiments.
Table 8.0.1: Overview of results
Category Experiments Results
Main effect of incentives SHARE,
GIP rem
Incentives raise
response rates
Prepaid versus promised incentives GIP Prepaid perform
better
Optimal incentive value SHARE Higher values lead to
higher response rates
Cost effectiveness GIP rem,
SHARE
Incentives are cost
effective
Sample composition GIP, GIP
rem,
SHARE
Little to no effect of
incentives on sample
composition.
Note: GIP=GIP recruitment incentive experiment;GIP rem=GIP reminder incentive experiment;
SHARE= SHAREGermany wave 4 incentive experiment
SHARE and GIP reminder incentives tested the main effect of incentives find-
ing that using incentives is more favorable than not using incentives. Prepaid ver-
sus promised incentives are tested in the GIP recruitment incentive experiment
finding that unconditional incentives lead to higher response rates. The incentive
value is examined in the SHARE experiment finding that higher incentives lead to
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higher response rates. TheGIP reminder incentive experiment and theSHAREex-
periment show that incentives are cost-efficient compared to not using incentives.
All experiments provide little to no evidence for effects on sample composition.
The experiments in this dissertation confirm the majority of the literature find-
ings that unconditional incentives have stronger effects on response rates than
conditional incentives. Strong effects of large incentives on response rates have
been shown in the literature before, however mainly in surveys outside of Eu-
rope. Widening the scope of incentive effects from response rates to sample bias
is an important step in increasing the knowledge on incentive effects in surveys.
The discussion of cost effectiveness of survey incentives in Germany is a new and
important contribution to the literature on incentives. Showing that survey incen-
tives are cost-efficient will help make the argument for the use of incentives when
communicating with survey sponsors and the public.
While the experiments in this dissertation answer some questions, other topics
of survey incentives remain to be researched in the future.
One aspect is the use of incentives inmixedmode surveys. Increasingly, surveys
are conducted in multiple survey modes to mix the advantages of several survey
modes or to reduce cost. When combining for example web, telephone and face-
to-face modes new challenges for the use of incentives arise. Optimal incentive
values or payment timesor formof incentivesmay vary across surveymodes. Thus,
the incentive strategy needs to be optimized in conjunction with the mixed-mode
design.
A second topic for future research is the cost effectiveness of incentives, espe-
cially to the survey environment in Germany. Asmentioned in chapter 6, it would
be helpful to examine the effects of incentives on the fieldwork, collaborating with
the survey agency conducting the fieldwork. Only such a collaborative setting
would allow to precisely measure how respondents and interviewers react to in-
centive treatments and how this influences the survey process.
A third aspect that should be examined in future research is the cost of incen-
tives in comparison to other survey costs. When distributing a survey budget to
get high quality survey data, investing in incentives is just one possibility to allo-
cate the budget. Other aspects might include investing in interviewer training, in-
terviewer incentives or improvements in questionnaire design. As budgets are lim-
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ited, spending money on one design feature of a survey prevents using the money
to improve other aspects of a study. Studies that experimentally test these trade
offs would help researchers make evidence based design decisions.
However, the basic question of this dissertation has been answered: uncondi-
tional cash incentives help raise response rates, are cost effective and do not influ-
ence sample composition. This is the same conclusionmade by J. ScottArmstrong
43 years ago. He concludes his review paper stating:
“What have we learned after four decades of research on monetary incentives
in mail surveys? The only type of monetary incentive that has an impact on the
nonresponse rate is the prepaid monetary incentive ... . The reductions in non-
response are substantial” (Armstrong, 1975, p. 116). 43 years later, I conclude
that these findings are true for face-to-face surveys in this dissertation. In addi-
tion, I showed that there are no effects of incentives on sample composition and
that incentives can be cost effective. While incentives are not the be-all and end-all
solution to all problems in surveymethodology, they are an important tool to keep
respondents returning to our surveys.
100
9
Appendix
101
Chapter 9: Appendix
                                                                                                                                    
                      
 
                    
 
 
 
Mannheim, Mai 2012 
 
Gesellschaft im Wandel 
 
 
Sehr geehrte Familie Mustermann, 
ein Brief von der Universität Mannheim? Anlass dafür ist unsere Studie „Gesellschaft im Wandel“, die 
wir zurzeit in ganz Deutschland durchführen. Wir möchten Sie mit diesem Schreiben herzlich bitten, 
uns zu unterstützen und an dieser Studie teilzunehmen, denn Ihre Meinung zählt! 
In den nächsten Tagen wird Sie ein/e Interviewer/in von TNS Infratest Sozialforschung in unserem 
Auftrag aufsuchen. Ihre Teilnahme ist aber selbstverständlich freiwillig. Als kleines Dankeschön wird 
Ihnen der/die Interviewer/in 10 Euro überreichen. 
Herzlichen Dank für Ihre Unterstützung!  
 
 
Mit freundlichen Grüßen,  
  
 
 
Prof. Christina Gathmann    Günter Steinacker   
Projektleiterin „Gesellschaft im Wandel“  Projektleiter TNS Infratest Sozialforschung 
 
 
P.S.: Kostenfreie Hotline für Rückfragen: 0800/1001425 (TNS Infratest Sozialforschung) 
 
Universität Mannheim | Schloss | 68163 Mannheim 
 
Familie Musterfrau 
Musterstraße 123 
12345 Musterstadt 
Figure 9.0.1: Advance Letter GIP 2012 recruitment, conditional incentive
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Mannheim, Mai 2012 
 
Gesellschaft im Wandel 
 
 
Sehr geehrte Familie Mustermann, 
ein Brief von der Universität Mannheim? Anlass dafür ist unsere Studie „Gesellschaft im Wandel“, die 
wir zurzeit in ganz Deutschland durchführen. Wir möchten Sie mit diesem Schreiben herzlich bitten, 
uns zu unterstützen und an dieser Studie teilzunehmen, denn Ihre Meinung zählt! 
In den nächsten Tagen wird Sie ein/e Interviewer/in von TNS Infratest Sozialforschung in unserem 
Auftrag aufsuchen. Ihre Teilnahme ist aber selbstverständlich freiwillig. Als kleines Dankeschön 
haben wir diesem Brief 5 Euro beigelegt. 
Herzlichen Dank für Ihre Unterstützung!  
 
 
Mit freundlichen Grüßen,  
  
 
 
Prof. Christina Gathmann    Günter Steinacker   
Projektleiterin „Gesellschaft im Wandel“  Projektleiter TNS Infratest Sozialforschung 
 
 
P.S.: Kostenfreie Hotline für Rückfragen: 0800/1001425 (TNS Infratest Sozialforschung) 
 
Universität Mannheim | Schloss | 68163 Mannheim 
 
Familie Musterfrau 
Musterstraße 123 
12345 Musterstadt 
Figure 9.0.2: Advance Letter GIP 2012 recruitment, unconditional incentive
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Mannheim, 2. November 2017  
Gesellschaft im Wandel 
 
 
Sehr geehrte Frau «NName», 
 
vor ein paar Wochen haben wir Sie per Brief zur online durchgeführten Studie „Gesellschaft 
im Wandel“ eingeladen. Da Briefe manchmal verloren gehen, möchten wir Sie heute gerne 
noch einmal auf unsere Studie aufmerksam machen. 
 
Für Ihre Teilnahme melden Sie sich möglichst bis zum (Datum + 2 Wochen) unter  
www.gesellschaft-im-wandel.de 
an, damit Sie dann schon an unserer nächsten Umfrage teilnehmen können. Die Anmeldung 
erfolgt mit Ihrer persönlichen Kennung und Ihrem Passwort. 
  
 
Kennung: 
 
Passwort:  
 
 
Ihre Zugangsdaten finden Sie auch im beigelegten Kärtchen. Bitte bewahren Sie diese für 
die Zukunft gut auf. 
 
Vielen Dank für Ihre Teilnahme an unserem Projekt. 
 
Mit freundlichen Grüßen,  
 
 
 
Prof. Christina Gathmann     
Projektleiterin „Gesellschaft im Wandel“ 
Bitte beachten Sie auch die Rückseite 
 
Universität Mannheim | Schloss | 68131 Mannheim 
 
Frau «VName» «NName» 
 
«HHAdr_1» «HHAdr_2» 
«HHAdr_3» «HHAdr_4» 
 
«TNSID» 
 «password» 
 
Figure 9.0.3: GIP 2012, First reminder letter without incentive
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Mannheim, 2. November 2017  
Gesellschaft im Wandel 
 
 
Sehr geehrte Frau «NName», 
 
vor ein paar Wochen haben wir Sie per Brief zur Fortsetzung der Studie „Gesellschaft im 
Wandel“ eingeladen. Da Briefe manchmal verloren gehen, möchten wir Sie heute gerne noch 
einmal auf unsere Studie aufmerksam machen.  
 
Für Ihre Teilnahme melden Sie sich möglichst bis zum (Datum + 2 Wochen) unter  
www.gesellschaft-im-wandel.de 
an, damit Sie dann schon an unserer nächsten Umfrage teilnehmen können. Als kleines 
Dankeschön haben wir diesem Brief 5 Euro beigelegt. 
 
Die Anmeldung erfolgt mit Ihrer persönlichen Kennung und Ihrem Passwort. 
 
Kennung: 
 
Passwort:  
 
Ihre Zugangsdaten finden Sie auch im beigelegten Kärtchen. Bitte bewahren Sie diese für 
die Zukunft gut auf. 
 
Vielen Dank für Ihre Teilnahme an unserem Projekt. 
 
Mit freundlichen Grüßen,  
 
 
Prof. Christina Gathmann     
Projektleiterin „Gesellschaft im Wandel“ 
Bitte beachten Sie auch die Rückseite. 
 
 
Universität Mannheim | Schloss | 68131 Mannheim 
 
Frau «VName» «NName» 
 
«HHAdr_1» «HHAdr_2» 
«HHAdr_3» «HHAdr_4» 
«TNSID» 
 «password» 
 
Figure 9.0.4: GIP 2012, First reminder letter with e 5cash incentive
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Gesellschaft im Wandel 
 
 
 
Worum geht es? 
In „Gesellschaft im Wandel“ geht es um Ihre Meinungen, Einstellungen und Erwartungen zu 
verschiedenen Themen wie Familie und Freunde, Arbeit und Freizeit, Wirtschaft und Politik. 
Die Befragungen werden alle 2 Monate über das Internet durch das LINK Institut für Markt- 
und Sozialforschung durchgeführt. Diese Befragungen sind Teil einer langfristigen 
wissenschaftlichen Studie der Universität Mannheim, die durch die Deutsche 
Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) gefördert wird. Die Studie dient keinerlei kommerziellen 
Zwecken. 
 
 
 
Was haben Sie davon? 
Mit Ihrer Teilnahme leisten Sie einen wertvollen Beitrag zur Wissenschaft und Sie helfen uns, 
das Zusammenleben in unserer Gesellschaft besser zu verstehen. Jeder Teilnehmer und jede 
Teilnehmerin ist für uns unersetzlich, und nur die von uns persönlich angeschriebenen 
Personen können an der Studie teilnehmen. Als Dankeschön bekommen Sie von uns für jede 
abgeschlossene Befragung 4 Euro und einen Bonus von bis zu 10 Euro, wenn Sie regelmäßig 
an den Befragungen teilgenommen haben. 
 
 
 
Freiwilligkeit und Anonymität 
Die Teilnahme an jeder einzelnen Online Umfrage, zu der wir Sie nach Ihrer Registrierung 
per Email einladen, ist freiwillig. Sie gehen mit der Registrierung keine dauerhafte 
Verpflichtung ein. Und natürlich erfolgen alle Auswertungen anonym gemäß den Vorgaben 
der Datenschutzgesetze. 
 
 
 
Haben Sie Fragen oder Anregungen? 
Internet:  www.gesellschaft-im-wandel.de 
E-Mail: info@gesellschaft-im-wandel.de 
Telefon: 0800/5892604 (kostenlos aus dem dt. Fest- und Mobilnetz) 
 
 
Figure 9.0.5: Reminder letter page 2, for both letters
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Table 9.0.1: Fixed-effects logistic regression on
GIP recruitment survey participation
Commercial area information
Purchasing power: medium (ref.)
Low 0.675 (−ƾ.ǅƽ)
High 0.638∗ (−ƿ.ǁƾ)
Low x uncond inventive 1.115 (ƽ.ǂƾ)
High x uncond incentive 1.289 (ƾ.ƿƾ)
High probability of:
University graduates 1.153 (ƽ.ǅǃ)
University graduates x uncond incentive 0.731 (−ƾ.ǁƿ)
Singles x uncond incentive 0.728 (−ƾ.ƽƽ)
Foreigners x uncond incentive 0.952 (−ƽ.ƿƿ)
Single households x uncond incentive 1.970∗ (ƿ.ƾǀ)
Public area information
Umployment quota: medium (ref.)
Low x uncond incentive 0.742 (−ƾ.ǁǁ)
High x uncond incentive 1.049 (ƽ.ƿǀ)
Interviewer observations
Intercom installed? 0.673∗∗ (−ǀ.ƾǁ)
Intercom installed? x uncond incentive 1.244 (ƾ.ƾǂ)
Building type: farm (ref.)
Familiy home 0.502 (−ƾ.ǃƽ)
Semi detatched house 0.554 (−ƾ.ǀǁ)
3-4 apts 0.564 (−ƾ.ƿǅ)
5-8 apts 0.547 (−ƾ.ǀǂ)
6:9+ apts 0.620 (−ƾ.ƽǀ)
High rise 1.429 (ƽ.ǂǄ)
Familiy home x uncond incentive 2.961 (ƾ.ǃǂ)
Semi detatched house x uncond incentive 2.809 (ƾ.ǂǁ)
3-4 apts x uncond incentive 2.784 (ƾ.ǂƽ)
5-8 apts x uncond incentive 2.822 (ƾ.ǂǁ)
6-9+ apts x uncond incentive 1.886 (ƽ.ǆƿ)
High rise x uncond incentive 0.987 (−ƽ.ƽƿ)
Building maintenance: good (ref.)
Medium 0.647∗ (−ƿ.ǁǂ)
Poor 0.548 (−ƾ.Ǆǃ)
Medium x uncond incentive 0.954 (−ƽ.ƿƾ)
Poor x uncond incentive 0.658 (−ƾ.ƽƽ)
Perceived class: poor (ref.)
Working 0.777 (−ƽ.Ǆǃ)
Middle 1.038 (ƽ.ƾƾ)
Upper middle 1.461 (ƽ.ǆǅ)
Upper 1.623 (ƽ.Ǆǅ)
Working x uncond incentive 0.944 (−ƽ.ƾƿ)
Middle x uncond incentive 1.093 (ƽ.ƾǆ)
Upper middle x uncond incentive 1.517 (ƽ.Ǆǀ)
Upper x uncond incentive 0.657 (−ƽ.ǁǀ)
N 3,132
Exponentiated coefficients; t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < ƽ.ƽǂ, ∗∗ p < ƽ.ƽƾ, ∗∗∗ p < ƽ.ƽƽƾ
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